Education Portal for Students in India

Fundamental right As per the RTE Act and Article 21 A of the Indian constitution Education up to 14 years is a fundamental right and it should be free and compulsory.
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What kind of right is right to education?

The right to education The right to education is a fundamental human right.61 million children do not have access to basic education and 758 million adults in the world are illiterate because they have never got any education, according to the 2016 Global Education Monitoring Report.

The right to education is a fundamental human right. Every individual, irrespective of race, gender, nationality, ethnic or social origin, religion or political preference, age or disability, is entitled to a free elementary education. This right has been universally recognised since the and has since been enshrined in various international conventions, national constitutions and development plans.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not only state the right to access education, but also of the quality of education: «. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

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Is right to education a fundamental right or DPSP?

Right to Education is a fundamental right emanating from right to _.A. freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 1 (A)B. culture and education under Article 29 and 30C. freedom under Article 21 AD. equality before the law and equal protection of the law under Article 14 Answer Verified Hint: The Right to Education serves as a building block for any nation’s development.

It ensures that children irrespective of their background, social, political or economical, have the right to get quality elementary education. Complete answer: Right to Education Act (RTE) deals with providing free and compulsory education to children. It is a fundamental right under Article 21-A. It was, at one point, enshrined in Part IV of the Indian Constitution.

Article 45 and Article 39 (f) of DPSP, included provisions for impartial and accessible education for children which will be state-funded. The Ramamurti Committee Report which came in 1990 was the first-ever official document on the Right to Education.

It was only in 1993, that the Supreme Court recognized it as a fundamental right. The landmark judgment of the Unnikrishnan JP vs State of Andhra Pradesh & Others case regarded that education is a fundamental right that flows from Article 21. After this judgement, Tapas Majumdar Committee was set up in 1999.

It incorporated the insertion of Article 21A. Hence, in 2002, by the 86th amendment to the Indian constitution, the Right to Education was recognised as a fundamental right in part-III of the Constitution. It also inserted Article 21A which made Right to Education fundamental with respect to children between 6-14 years.

So, the correct answer is option C. Note: The Right to Education Bill 2008 was passed after the amendment and finally Right to Education Act 2009 was brought in. This act mandates 25% reservation for socially disadvantaged sections of the society including SCs, STs, other backward class and the Differently abled.

: Right to Education is a fundamental right emanating from right to _.A. freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 1 (A)B. culture and education under Article 29 and 30C. freedom under Article 21 AD. equality before the law and equal protection of the law under Article 14
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Is education a basic right in India?

As per the RTE Act and Article 21 A of the Indian constitution Education up to 14 years is a fundamental right and it should be free and compulsory.
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Is right to education a human right?

Article 27 –

Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

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Why education is a basic human right?

It is fundamental for human, social, and economic development and a key element to achieving lasting peace and sustainable development. It is a powerful tool in developing the full potential of everyone and ensuring human dignity, and in promoting individual and collective wellbeing.
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Was right to education a directive principle?

Right To Education: One Fundamental Right At Cost Of Another Fundamental Right?

• Education imparted by heart can bring revolution in the society – Maulana Abul kalam azad
• Background:
• Article 45 (unamended)
• In Re Kerala education Bill
• In Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka
• In Unni Krishnan v. State of Andra Pradesh
• The scheme framed by court in Unni Krishnan and followed by government held to be a unreasonable restriction under clause 6 of Article 19 in TMA Pai foundation case,

The Right to education was initially not included as a fundamental right in the constitution of India and our founding fathers has included education as a Directive principles of state policy under Part IV of the constitution of India. Provision for free and compulsory education for children The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years The directive under Article 45 was confined not merely to primary education but to the education up to the age of 14 years irrespective of stage of education.

The court emphasized that solemn obligation is placed on state by Article 45 which can be discharged by it through governmental and aided schools and that Article 45 doesn’t require that obligation to be discharged at the expense of minority communities. Without making the right to education a reality, the fundamental rights would remain beyond the reach of large majority which is illiterate.

Capitation fees is nothing but a price for selling education and this amounts to commercialization of education. The court observed that capitation fees is nothing but a price for selling education and this would amount to commercialization of education.

The court took an extremely expansive view of state obligation to provide education to everyone at all levels. This approach created practical hurdles to meet day to day economic issues for private educational institutions as well as state. The approach of court was guided by an assumption of seeing education not as an occupation under sub clause (g) of clause (6) of article 19.

The Right to education is implicit in Article 21 read with Article 41, 45 and 46 but merely to rely on directive principles per se doesn’t mean that each and every obligation casted by directive principles would automatically included in purview of Article 21.

The State obligation limited until the child attain the age of 14 years and beyond that stage, state obligation to provide education is subject to the limits of economic capacity and development of state. The obligation of state can be discharged by state either through governmental schools or private aided schools.

Article 14 applies to state Institutions and its application cannot be excluded by supplementary activity. The court evolved a scheme regarding level of fees chargeable by private educational institutions.
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Is Dpsp and fundamental rights same?

Difference between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy & Their Comparisons Difference between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) is explained here in detail. Fundamental Rights are human rights conferred on the citizens of India.

DPSP are ideals that are meant to be kept in mind by the State when it formulates policies and enacts laws. The difference between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy given here can help the UPSC Civil Service exam aspirants to understand the basics better and know their comparisons thoroughly.

Aspirants would find this article very helpful while preparing for the, Difference between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy – UPSC Notes:- The major differences between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy are given below:

Fundamental Rights	Directive Principles of State Policy
Part 3 of the Constitution of India contains the Fundamental Rights guaranteed to the citizens of India. Articles 12-35 of the Constitution of India deal with Fundamental Rights.	Directive Principles are written in Part 4 of the Constitution of India. They are given in Articles 36-51 of the Constitution of India.
The basic rights that are guaranteed to Indian citizens by the Constitution of India are known as Fundamental Rights	Directive Principles of the Indian constitution are the guidelines to be followed by the Government while framing policies.
Political Democracy is established in India with the help of Fundamental Rights given in the Constitution of India.	Economic and Social Democracy is established with the help of the Directive Principles of State Policy
The welfare of each and every citizen is promoted through the Fundamental Rights	The welfare of the entire community is fostered with the help of Directive Principles.
As per the law, the violation of Fundamental Rights is punishable.	Violation of Directive Principles is not a punishable crime unlike violation of Fundamental Rights
Fundamental Rights are justiciable as they can be enforced legally by the courts if there is a violation.	Directive Principles are not justiciable as they cannot be enforced by the courts if there is a violation.
If there is a law which is in violation of fundamental rights then the courts can declare it as invalid and unconstitutional.	If there is a law in violation of Directive Principles, then the courts do not have the power to declare it as invalid and unconstitutional.
Fundamental Rights are sometimes considered as a kind of restrictions imposed on the State.	Directive Principles are directions for the Government in helping it to achieve some particular objectives.
Fundamental rights can be suspended during a national emergency. But, the rights guaranteed under Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended.	Directive Principles of State Policy can never be suspended under any circumstances.
Fundamental Rights was borrowed from the Constitution of the United States of America	Directive Principles of State Policy was borrowed from the Constitution of Ireland which was in turn copied from the Constitution of Spain.

These are the main differences between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP). The differences given in the table above can help UPSC Civil Service Exam aspirants to answer any related questions easily in the exams. After learning about the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy difference, it is better to know the details of the Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights given in the Constitution thoroughly.

Visit the below-given links to learn about Directive Principles of State Policy, Fundamental Rights, an Overview of the Constitution of India, List of Important Articles in the Constitution of India, 13 Major Features of Indian Constitution, Fundamental duties of Indian citizens in detail along with other information.

Also visit the links on Constitutional Amendment Process, Important Amendments in Indian Constitution, 12 Schedules of Indian Constitution, 42nd and 44th Constitutional Amendment. The link on Indian Polity Notes should help aspiring candidates prepare very comprehensively for the UPSC Civil Service Exam.

Difference between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy – UPSC Notes:- The expression “Justice- social, economic, political” is sought to be achieved through DPSPs. DPSPs are incorporated to attain the ultimate ideals of preamble, i.e., Justice, Liberty, Equality and fraternity.

Moreover, it also embodies the idea of the welfare state which India was deprived of under colonial rule. Seven fundamental rights originally provided by the Constitution were the right to equality, right to freedom, right against exploitation, right to freedom of religion, cultural and educational rights, right to property and right to constitutional remedies.

The above details would help candidates prepare for, Related Links

: Difference between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy & Their Comparisons
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Is education a social rights?

Your Right to Equality in Education Getting an education isn’t just about books and grades – we’re also learning how to participate fully in the life of this nation. (We’re tomorrow’s leaders after all!) But in order to really participate, we need to know our rights – otherwise we may lose them.

• The highest law in our land is the U.S.
• Constitution, which has some amendments, known as the Bill of Rights.
• The Bill of Rights guarantees that the government can never deprive people in the U.S.
• Of certain fundamental rights including the right to freedom of religion and to free speech and the due process of law.

Many federal and state laws give us additional rights, too. The Bill of Rights applies to young people as well as adults. And what I’m going to do right here is tell you about EQUAL TREATMENT, DO ALL KIDS HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN EQUAL EDUCATION? Yes! All kids living in the United States have the right to a free public education.

1. And the Constitution requires that all kids be given equal educational opportunity no matter what their race, ethnic background, religion, or sex, or whether they are rich or poor, citizen or non-citizen.
2. Even if you are in this country illegally, you have the right to go to public school.
3. The ACLU is fighting hard to make sure this right isn’t taken away.

In addition to this constitutional guarantee of an equal education, many federal, state and local laws also protect students against discrimination in education based on sexual orientation or disability, including pregnancy and HIV status. In fact, even though some kids may complain about having to go to school, the right to an equal educational opportunity is one of the most valuable rights you have.
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Is education a civil or human right?

International laws declare education to be an inherent human right. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights both establish the right to free primary education that is accessible for all.

Equitable access to higher education is also emphasized. According to these human rights laws, education helps humans reach their highest potential; it is a means by which they can attain empowerment, freedom, and yield other developmental benefits. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization adds that education is a powerful tool by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty and participate in society as full citizens.

Yet, access to quality education is significantly limited for many in the United States, where more money is spent on the prison system than on the education system. In other developed countries, public schools normally receive funding based on the number of students enrolled, in both rich and poor neighborhoods alike.

However, the United States’ funding mechanism for primary education relies heavily on local wealth. This method generates disparities that specifically affect those students most in need of the promise education holds for them. In addition to the poor quality of the educational system itself, schools in low-income communities of color frequently have harsh school discipline policies that have been shown to drive students out of school and towards incarceration.

Once in prison, the deprivation of human rights can continue. In 1971, the inhumane living conditions at New York’s Attica prison gave rise to a civil and human rights protest led by those incarcerated in the facility. In addition to the overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and lack of grievance procedures, the protesters objected to the lack of reading materials and lack of opportunity to participate in education.

The state responded to this uprising with a raid by state troopers that resulted in the tragic deaths of 29 incarcerated people and 10 others, and the torture of other incarcerated people who were injured in the raid. After this horrific event, some modest prison reforms were implemented to ensure the humane treatment of incarcerated people.

These reforms included access to high school equivalency and college level courses. But these hard-won human rights victories were severely diminished in 1995 when access to New York’s Tuition Assistance Program (TAP) was stripped from people who are in prison.

• A new report, due to be released on May 12, explores the benefits of reinstating TAP funding for people in prison.
• The report conveys the plethora of benefits—particularly health benefits—of participating in postsecondary education in prison for the individuals, their families, and communities.
• Though not explicitly, the report also parallels international laws.

Just as health is a human right, education is a human right that should be available without discrimination or exclusion if we wish to achieve a just society. Since 2012, the Vera Institute of Justice, through our leadership of the national Pathways from Prison to Postsecondary Education Project, has provided selected states with incentive funding and technical assistance to expand access to higher education for people in prison and those recently released.

The Pathways Project seeks to demonstrate that access to postsecondary education, combined with coordinated reentry services, can increase educational credentials, reduce recidivism, and increase employability and earnings. The project also aims to spur long-term public investment and national replication.

In building on this work, Vera was recently selected by the U.S. Department of Justice ‘s Bureau of Justice Assistance to provide an online resource center and training and technical assistance to state departments of corrections as well as state and local policymakers interested in implementing college-in-prison programs.

• This new initiative is called the Expanding Access to Postsecondary Education Project,
• The time is now to fully recognize education as a fundamental and universal human right.
• Increasing access to high quality postsecondary education for incarcerated individuals—an overwhelming majority of whom will be returning to the community—ensures that they have the tools to build better futures for themselves, their families, and their communities.

To access more information from the report, visit: http://turnonthetapny.org/ on May 12.
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Is the right to education a first generation human right?

These second generation rights are the rights of the individual or group to receive social provision or services to achieve full potential as human beings. They include rights to housing, health, an adequate wage, employment, food and education.
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What are human rights in India?

There are six fundamental rights in India. They are Right to Equality, Right to Freedom, Right against Exploitation, Right to Freedom of Religion, Cultural and Educational Rights, and Right to Constitutional Remedies.
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What are basic human rights?

What Are Human Rights? – Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more. Everyone is entitled to these rights, without discrimination.
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Which article under Dpsp has become a fundamental right?

Introduction – Part III of the Indian Constitution guarantees “fundamental rights” to all citizens, and some of these, like the right to life (art.21) and the right to equality (art.14), to all persons. The fundamental rights are enforceable in the High Courts and the Supreme Court.

• In writ petitions before these courts, a person or a citizen can seek enforcement of fundamental rights and redress for their breach.
• Judicial review of executive action as well as of legislation and judicial and quasi-judicial orders is recognized as part of the “basic structure” of the Constitution which cannot be taken away even by an amendment to the Constitution.1 The Supreme Court has the final word on the interpretation of the Constitution, and its orders, being law, are binding and enforceable by all authorities—executive, legislative and judicial.2 The Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) are contained in part IV, articles 36 to 50, of the Indian Constitution.

Many of the provisions correspond to the provisions of the ICESCR. For instance, article 43 provides that the state shall endeavor to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organization or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities, and in particular the state shall endeavor to promote cottage industries on an individual or cooperative basis in rural areas.

1. This corresponds more or less to articles 11 and 15 of the ICESCR.
2. However, some of the ICESCR rights, for instance, the right to health (art.12), have been interpreted by the Indian Supreme Court to form part of the right to life under article 21 of the Constitution, thus making it directly enforceable and justiciable.3 As a party to the ICESCR, the Indian legislature has enacted laws giving effect to some of its treaty obligations and these laws are in turn enforceable in and by the courts.

Article 37 of the Constitution declares that the DPSP “shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the state to apply these principles in making laws.” It is not a mere coincidence that the apparent distinction that is drawn by scholars between the ICCPR rights and ESC rights holds good for the distinction that is drawn in the Indian context between fundamental rights and DPSP.4 Thus the bar to justiciability of the DPSP is spelled out in some sense in the Constitution itself.

However, the Indian judiciary has overcome this apparent limitation by a creative and interpretative exercise. In what context that happened and how is what is proposed to be examined in this case study. After briefly tracing the development of this interpretative exercise through case law in the first three decades of the working of the Constitution, I propose to examine the response of the judiciary in the context of justiciability and enforceability of specific ESC rights.

Fundamental Rights versus DPSP When the tussle for primacy between fundamental rights and DPSP came up before the Supreme Court first, the court said, “The directive principles have to conform to and run subsidiary to the chapter on fundamental rights.” 5 Later, in the Fundamental Rights Case (referred to above), the majority opinions reflected the view that what is fundamental in the governance of the country cannot be less significant than what is significant in the life of the individual.

Another judge constituting the majority in that case said: “In building up a just social order it is sometimes imperative that the fundamental rights should be subordinated to directive principles.” 6 This view, that the fundamental rights and DPSP are complementary, “neither part being superior to the other,” has held the field since.7 The DPSP have, through important constitutional amendments, become the benchmark to insulate legislation enacted to achieve social objectives, as enumerated in some of the DPSP, from attacks of invalidation by courts.

This way, legislation for achieving agrarian reforms, and specifically for achieving the objectives of articles 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution, has been immunized from challenge as to its violation of the right to equality (art.14) and freedoms of speech, expression, etc.

Art.19).8 However, even here the court has retained its power of judicial review to examine if, in fact, the legislation is intended to achieve the objective of articles 39(b) and (c), and where the legislation is an amendment to the Constitution, whether it violates the basic structure of the constitution.9 Likewise, courts have used DPSP to uphold the constitutional validity of statutes that apparently impose restrictions on the fundamental rights under article 19 (freedoms of speech, expression, association, residence, travel and to carry on a business, trade or profession), as long as they are stated to achieve the objective of the DPSP.10 The DPSP are seen as aids to interpret the Constitution, and more specifically to provide the basis, scope and extent of the content of a fundamental right.

To quote again from the Fundamental Rights case: Fundamental rights have themselves no fixed content; most of them are empty vessels into which each generation must pour its content in the light of its experience. Restrictions, abridgement, curtailment and even abrogation of these rights in circumstances not visualised by the constitution makers might become necessary; their claim to supremacy or priority is liable to be overborne at particular stages in the history of the nation by the moral claims embodied in Part IV.11 Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation The internal emergency that was in force between 1975 and 1977 and its aftermath contributed significantly to the change in the judiciary’s perception of its role in the working of the Constitution.

1. The period of the emergency witnessed large-scale violations of basic rights of life and liberty.
2. There were also blatant violations of the right to freedom of speech and expression.
3. The end of the emergency saw the emergence of a realignment of political forces.
4. Nevertheless, the popularly elected government was weak and in trying to find its feet, it did not last very long.

It was already collapsing by 1978/1979, which was when the judiciary initiated the public-interest litigation (PIL) movement. The development of the jurisprudence of ESC rights is also inextricably linked to this significant development. The lifting of the emergency and the realignment of political forces had not resulted in any dramatic change in the social imbalances or executive excesses that had by then become endemic.

The postemergency period then provided the right environment for the judiciary to redeem itself as a protector and enforcer of the rule of law. Judges woke up to this need and PIL was the tool the judiciary shaped to achieve this end. PIL was entirely a judge-led and judge-dominated movement.12 What made PIL unique was that it acknowledged that a majority of the population, on account of their social, economic and other disabilities, was unable to access the justice system.

The insurmountable walls of procedure were dismantled and suddenly the doors of the Supreme Court were open to people and issues that had never reached there before. By relaxing the rules of standing and procedure to the point where even a postcard could be treated as a writ petition, the judiciary ushered in a new phase of activism where litigants were freed from the stranglehold of formal law and lawyering.

The Maneka Gandhi Case and Thereafter Simultaneously, the judiciary took upon itself the task of infusing into the constitutional provisions the spirit of social justice. This it did in a series of cases of which Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India was a landmark.13 The case involved the refusal by the government to grant a passport to the petitioner, which thus restrained her liberty to travel.

In answering the question whether this denial could be sustained without a predecisional hearing, the court proceeded to explain the scope and content of the right to life and liberty. In a departure from the earlier view, 14 the court asserted the doctrine of substantive due process as integral to the chapter on fundamental rights and emanating from a collective understanding of the scheme underlying articles 14 (the right to equality), 19 (the freedoms) and 21 (the right to life).

The power the court has to strike down legislation was thus broadened to include critical examination of the substantive due process element in statutes. Once the court took a broader view of the scope and content of the fundamental right to life and liberty, there was no looking back. Article 21 was interpreted to include a bundle of other incidental and integral rights, many of them in the nature of ESC rights.

In Francis Coralie Mullin the court declared: “The right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and comingling with fellow human beings.

The magnitude and components of this right would depend upon the extent of economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include the bare necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human self.” 15 The combined effect of the expanded interpretation of the right to life and the use of PIL as a tool led the court into areas where there was a crying need for social justice.

These were areas where there was a direct interaction between law and poverty, as in the case of bonded labor and child labor, and crime and poverty, as in the case of undertrials in jails. In reading several of these concomitant rights of dignity, living conditions, health into the ambit of the right to life, the court overcame the difficulty of justiciability of these as economic and social rights, which were hitherto, in their manifestation as DPSP, considered nonenforceable.

• A brief look at how some of these ESC rights were dealt with by the court in four specific contexts will help understand the development of the law in this area.
• Right to Work Article 41 of the Constitution provides that “the State shall within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want.” 16 Article 38 states that the state shall strive to promote the welfare of the people and article 43 states it shall endeavor to secure a living wage and a decent standard of life to all workers.

One of the contexts in which the problem of enforceability of such a right was posed before the Supreme Court was of large-scale abolition of posts of village officers in the State of Tamil Nadu in India. In negating the contention that such an abolition of posts would fall foul of the DPSP, the court said: It is no doubt true that Article 38 and Article 43 of the Constitution insist that the State should endeavour to find sufficient work for the people so that they may put their capacity to work into economic use and earn a fairly good living.

• But these articles do not mean that everybody should be provided with a job in the civil service of the State and if a person is provided with one he should not be asked to leave it even for a just cause.
• If it were not so, there would be justification for a small percentage of the population being in Government service and in receipt of regular income and a large majority of them remaining outside with no guaranteed means of living.

It would certainly be an ideal state of affairs if work could be found for all the able-bodied men and women and everybody is guaranteed the right to participate in the production of national wealth and to enjoy the fruits thereof. But we are today far away from that goal.

The question whether a person who ceases to be a government servant according to law should be rehabilitated by being given an alternative employment is, as the law stands today, a matter of policy on which the court has no voice.17 But the court has since then felt freer to interfere even in areas which would have been considered to be in the domain of the policy of the executive.

Where the issue was of regularizing the services of a large number of casual (nonpermanent) workers in the posts and telegraphs department of the government, the court has not hesitated to invoke the DPSP to direct such regularization. The explanation was: Even though the above directive principle may not be enforceable as such by virtue of Article 37 of the Constitution of India, it may be relied upon by the petitioners to show that in the instant case they have been subjected to hostile discrimination.

• It is urged that the State cannot deny at least the minimum pay in the pay scales of regularly employed workmen even though the Government may not be compelled to extend all the benefits enjoyed by regularly recruited employees.
• We are of the view that such denial amounts to exploitation of labour.
• The Government cannot take advantage of its dominant position, and compel any worker to work even as a casual labourer on starvation wages.

It may be that the casual labourer has agreed to work on such low wages. That he has done because he has no other choice. It is poverty that has driven him to that state. The Government should be a model employer. We are of the view that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the classification of employees into regularly recruited employees and casual employees for the purpose of paying less than the minimum pay payable to employees in the corresponding regular cadres particularly in the lowest rungs of the department where the pay scales are the lowest is not tenable,

1. It is true that all these rights cannot be extended simultaneously.
2. But they do indicate the socialist goal.
3. The degree of achievement in this direction depends upon the economic resources, willingness of the people to produce and more than all the existence of industrial peace throughout the country.

Of those rights the question of security of work is of utmost importance.18 In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, 19 a PIL by an NGO highlighted the deplorable condition of bonded laborers in a quarry in Haryana, not very far from the Supreme Court.

1. A host of protective and welfare-oriented labor legislation, including the Bonded Labour (Abolition) Act and the Minimum Wages Act, were being observed in the breach.
2. In giving extensive directions to the state government to enable it to discharge its constitutional obligation towards the bonded laborers, the court said: 20 The right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy and particularly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Article 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include protection of the health and strength of workers, men and women, and of the tender age of children against abuse, opportunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief.

These are the minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity and no State has the right to take any action which will deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic essentials. Since the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39, Articles 41 and 42 are not enforceable in a court of law, it may not be possible to compel the State through the judicial process to make provision by statutory enactment or executive fiat for ensuring these basic essentials which go to make up a life of human dignity, but where legislation is already enacted by the State providing these basic requirements to the workmen and thus investing their right to live with basic human dignity, with concrete reality and content, the State can certainly be obligated to ensure observance of such legislation, for inaction on the part of the State in securing implementation of such legislation would amount to denial of the right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21, more so in the context of Article 256 which provides that the executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State.21 Thus the court converted what seemed a non-justiciable issue into a justiciable one by invoking the wide sweep of the enforceable article 21.

More recently, the court performed a similar exercise when, in the context of articles 21 and 42, it evolved legally binding guidelines to deal with the problems of sexual harassment of women at the work place.22 The right of workmen to be heard at the stage of winding up of a company was a contentious issue.

In a bench of five judges that heard the case the judges that constituted the majority that upheld the right were three. The justification for the right was traced to the newly inserted article 43-A, which asked the state to take suitable steps to secure participation of workers in management.

The court observed: It is therefore idle to contend 32 years after coming into force of the Constitution and particularly after the introduction of article 43-A in the Constitution that the workers should have no voice in the determination of the question whether the enterprises should continue to run or be shut down under an order of the court.

It would indeed be strange that the workers who have contributed to the building of the enterprise as a centre of economic power should have no right to be heard when it is sought to demolish that centre of economic power.23 Right to Shelter Unlike certain other ESC rights, the right to shelter, which forms part of the right to an adequate standard of living under article 11 of the ICESCR, finds no corresponding expression in the DPSP.

1. This right has been seen as forming part of article 21 itself.
2. The court has gone as far as to say, “The right to life,
3. Would take within its sweep the right to food,
4. And a reasonable accommodation to live in.” 24 However, given that these observations were not made in a petition by a homeless person seeking shelter, it is doubtful that this declaration would be in the nature of a positive right that could be said to be enforceable.

On the other hand, in certain other contexts with regard to housing for the poor, the court has actually refused to recognize any such absolute right. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 25 the court held that the right to life included the right to livelihood.

1. The petitioners contended that since they would be deprived of their livelihood if they were evicted from their slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction would be tantamount to deprivation of their life and hence be unconstitutional.
2. The court, however, was not prepared to go that far.
3. It denied that contention, saying: No one has the right to make use of a public property for a private purpose without requisite authorisation and, therefore, it is erroneous to contend that pavement dwellers have the right to encroach upon pavements by constructing dwellings thereon,

If a person puts up a dwelling on the pavement, whatever may be the economic compulsions behind such an act, his use of the pavement would become unauthorised. Later benches of the Supreme Court have followed the Olga Tellis dictum with approval. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.

Gurnam Kaur, 26 the court held that the Municipal Corporation of Delhi had no legal obligation to provide pavement squatters alternative shops for rehabilitation as the squatters had no legal enforceable right. In Sodan Singh v. NDMC 27 a constitution bench of the Supreme Court reiterated that the question whether there can at all be a fundamental right of a citizen to occupy a particular place on the pavement where he can squat and engage in trade must be answered in the negative.

These cases fail to account for socioeconomic compulsions that give rise to pavement dwelling and restrict their examination of the problem from a purely statutory point of view rather than the human rights perspective. Fortunately, a different note has been struck in a recent decision of the court.

• In Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v.
• Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, 28 in the context of eviction of encroachers in a busy locality of Ahmedabad city, the court said: Due to want of facilities and opportunities, the right to residence and settlement is an illusion to the rural and urban poor.
• Articles 38, 39 and 46 mandate the State, as its economic policy, to provide socio-economic justice to minimise inequalities in income and in opportunities and status.

It positively charges the State to distribute its largesse to the weaker sections of the society envisaged in Article 46 to make socio-economic justice a reality, meaningful and fruitful so as to make life worth living with dignity of person and equality of status and to constantly improve excellence.

Though no person has a right to encroach and erect structures or otherwise on footpaths, pavements or public streets or any other place reserved or earmarked for a public purpose, the State has the constitutional duty to provide adequate facilities and opportunities by distributing its wealth and resources for settlement of life and erection of shelter over their heads to make the right to life meaningful.29 Right to Health The right to health has been perhaps the least difficult area for the court in terms of justiciability, but not in terms of enforceability.

Article 47 of DPSP provides for the duty of the state to improve public health. However, the court has always recognized the right to health as being an integral part of the right to life.30 The principle got tested in the case of an agricultural laborer whose condition, after a fall from a running train, worsened considerably when as many as seven government hospitals in Calcutta refused to admit him as they did not have beds vacant.

• The Supreme Court did not stop at declaring the right to health to be a fundamental right and at enforcing that right of the laborer by asking the Government of West Bengal to pay him compensation for the loss suffered.
• It directed the government to formulate a blue print for primary health care with particular reference to treatment of patients during an emergency.31 In Consumer Education and Research Centre v.

Union of India 32 the court, in a PIL, tackled the problem of the health of workers in the asbestos industry. Noticing that long years of exposure to the harmful chemical could result in debilitating asbestosis, the court mandated compulsory health insurance for every worker as enforcement of the worker’s fundamental right to health.

1. It is again in PIL that the court has had occasion to examine the quality of drugs and medicines being marketed in the country and even ask that some of them be banned.33 A note of caution was struck when government employees protested against the reduction of their entitlements to medical care.
2. The court said: No State or country can have unlimited resources to spend on any of its projects.

That is why it only approves its projects to the extent it is feasible. The same holds good for providing medical facilities to its citizens including its employees. Provision on facilities cannot be unlimited. It has to be to the extent finances permit.

1. If no scale or rate is fixed then in case private clinics or hospitals increase their rate to exorbitant scales, the State would be bound to reimburse the same.
2. The principle of fixation of rate and scale under the new policy is justified and cannot be held to be violative of article 21 or article 47 of the Constitution.34 Right to Education Article 45 of the DPSP, which corresponds to article 13(1) of the ICESCR, states, “The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years.” Thus, while the right of a child not to be employed in hazardous industries was, by virtue of article 24, recognized to be a fundamental right, the child’s right to education was put into the DPSP in part IV and deferred for a period of ten years.

The question whether the right to education was a fundamental right and enforceable as such was answered by the Supreme Court in the affirmative in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka,35 The correctness of this decision was examined by a larger bench of five judges in Unnikrishnan J.P.v.

State of Andhra Pradesh,36 The occasion was the challenge, by private medical and engineering colleges, to state legislation regulating the charging of “capitation” fees from students seeking admission. The college management was seeking enforcement of their right to business. The court expressly denied this claim and proceeded to examine the nature of the right to education.

The court refused to accept the nonenforceablity of the DPSP. It asked: It is noteworthy that among the several articles in Part IV, only Article 45 speaks of a time-limit; no other article does. Has it no significance? Is it a mere pious wish, even after 44 years of the Constitution? Can the State flout the said direction even after 44 years on the ground that the article merely calls upon it to endeavour to provide the same and on the further ground that the said article is not enforceable by virtue of the declaration in Article 37.

Does not the passage of 44 years—more than four times the period stipulated in Article 45—convert the obligation created by the article into an enforceable right? In this context, we feel constrained to say that allocation of available funds to different sectors of education in India discloses an inversion of priorities indicated by the Constitution.

The Constitution contemplated a crash programme being undertaken by the State to achieve the goal set out in Article 45. It is relevant to notice that Article 45 does not speak of the “limits of its economic capacity and development” as does Article 41, which inter alia speaks of right to education.

What has actually happened is more money is spent and more attention is directed to higher education than to—and at the cost of—primary education. (By primary education, we mean the education which a normal child receives by the time he completes 14 years of age.) Neglected more so are the rural sectors, and the weaker sections of the society referred to in Article 46.

We clarify, we are not seeking to lay down the priorities for the Government—we are only emphasising the constitutional policy as disclosed by Articles 45, 46 and 41. Surely the wisdom of these constitutional provisions is beyond question.37 The court then proceeded to examine how this right would be enforceable and to what extent.

It clarified the issue thus: The right to education further means that a citizen has a right to call upon the State to provide educational facilities to him within the limits of its economic capacity and development. By saying so, we are not transferring Article 41 from Part IV to Part III—we are merely relying upon Article 41 to illustrate the content of the right to education flowing from Article 21.

We cannot believe that any State would say that it need not provide education to its people even within the limits of its economic capacity and development. It goes without saying that the limits of economic capacity are, ordinarily speaking, matters within the subjective satisfaction of the State.38 More caution followed.

The court’s apprehension clearly was that recognition of such a right might open the flood gates for other claims. It clarified: We must hasten to add that just because we have relied upon some of the directive principles to locate the parameters of the right to education implicit in Article 21, it does not follow automatically that each and every obligation referred to in Part IV gets automatically included within the purview of Article 21.

We have held the right to education to be implicit in the right to life because of its inherent fundamental importance. As a matter of fact, we have referred to Articles 41, 45 and 46 merely to determine the parameters of the said right.39 In fact, the court had broken new ground in the matter of justiciability and enforceability of the DPSP.

The decision in Unnikrishnan has been applied by the court in formulating broad parameters for compliance by the government in the matter of eradication of child labor. This it did in a PIL where it said: Now, strictly speaking a strong case exists to invoke the aid of Article 41 of the Constitution regarding the right to work and to give meaning to what has been provided in Article 47 relating to raising of standard of living of the population, and Articles 39 (e) and (f) as to non-abuse of tender age of children and giving opportunities and facilities to them to develop in a healthy manner, for asking the State to see that an adult member of the family, whose child is in employment in a factory or a mine or in other hazardous work, gets a job anywhere, in lieu of the child.

This would also see the fulfilment of the wish contained in Article 41 after about half a century of its being in the paramount parchment, like primary education desired by Article 45, having been given the status of fundamental right by the decision in Unnikrishnan,

• We are, however, not asking the State at this stage to ensure alternative employment in every case covered by Article 24, as Article 41 speaks about right to work “within the limits of the economic capacity and development of the State”.
• The very large number of child labour in the aforesaid occupations would require giving of job to a very large number of adults, if we were to ask the appropriate Government to assure alternative employment in every case, which would strain the resources of the State, in case it would not have been able to secure job for an adult in a private sector establishment or, for that matter, in a public sector organisation.

We are not issuing any direction to do so presently. Instead, we leave the matter to be sorted out by the appropriate Government. In those cases where it would not be possible to provide job as above mentioned, the appropriate Government would, as its contribution/grant, deposit in the aforesaid Fund a sum of Rs.5000/- for each child employed in a factory or mine or in any other hazardous employment.40 The court, while recognizing the importance of declaring the child’s negative right against exploitation and positive right to education, chose a pragmatic approach when it came to enforceability.

1. Earlier the court would have shrugged off the whole issue as not being within its domain.
2. That has now changed as is clear from the recent trend of cases.
3. Conclusion This much is clear from the above narration—that ESC rights are no less important than fundamental rights in the constitutional scheme.
4. They are enforceable when they are projected as supplying the content of a fundamental right, 41 but not just by themselves.42 The judiciary will not be fettered by any apparent injunction in the Constitution against non-enforceability of the DPSP.

It will, on the other hand, pin the state to its obligations towards the citizens by referring to the DPSP. Such obligation, the court has explained in the context of right to environment, can confer corresponding rights on the citizen: It need hardly be added that the duty cast on the State under Articles 47 and 48-A in particular of Part IV of the Constitution is to be read as conferring a corresponding right on the citizens and, therefore, the right under Article 21 at least must be read to include the same within its ambit.

1. At this point of time, the effect of the quality of the environment on the life of the inhabitants is much too obvious to require any emphasis or elaboration.43 The ESC rights that the DPSP symbolize can demonstrably be read as forming part of an enforceable regime of fundamental rights.
2. What then is crucial is the will of the state to implement this constitutional mandate.

The agenda of the state can be shaped to a considerable extent by a creative and activist judiciary. The state has to be constantly reminded of its obligations and duties. The actual realization of ESC rights may be a long-drawn affair, but keeping it on the agenda is more than half that effort.

The Indian judiciary has through a combination of strategies done just that. That is the Indian experience. NOTES _ 1, Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 (cited hereafter as the Fundamental Rights case).2, Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754 at 766 para.7. Article 142 of the Constitution declares that any order of the Supreme Court is enforceable throughout the territory of India and article 144 mandates that all civil and judicial authorities shall act in aid of the Supreme Court.3,

Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 2 SCR 516.4, See D.J. Ravindran, Human Rights Praxis: A Resource Book for Study, Action and Reflection (Bangkok: Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, 1998), 124, where he questions the validity of the view that civil and political rights are human rights and economic, social and cultural rights are only aspirations.5,

1. State of Madras v.
2. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) SCR 525.6,
3. Mathew, J.
4. In the Fundamental Rights case, note 1 above, SCC para.1707, p.879.7,V.R.Krishna Iyer,J.
5. In State of Kerala v.N.M.
6. Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310 at para.134, p.367.8,
7. Articles 39(a) and (b) provide that: The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing:- (a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means to livelihood.

(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; Articles 31B and 31C of the Constitution were introduced by the 1st and 25th amendments to the Constitution. In fact the Fundamental Rights case concerned the constitutional validity of article 31C of the Constitution.9,

Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625; Waman Rao v. Union of India (1981) 2 SCC 362.10, For instance Article 43 dealing with living wages and conditions of work has been relied upon to sustain the reasonableness of the restriction imposed by the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Chandra Bhavan v. State of Mysore (1970) 2 SCR 600.11,

See note 1, SCC para.1714, p.881.12, For an analytical account see Upendra Baxi, “Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India,” in Supreme Court on Public Interest Litigation, ed. Jagga Kapur, vol. I (1998), p. A-91.13.

(1978) 1 SCC 248.14, Until the decision in Maneka Gandhi, the court stuck to the view it first took in A.K.Gopalan v. State of Madras 1950 SCR 88, that article 21, which stated that “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law,” meant that as long as there was a law made by the legislature taking away a person’s liberty, such law could never be challenged as being violative of fundamental rights.15,

Francis Coralie Mullin case, note 3 above, p.529 B-F.16, This corresponds to article 6 of the ICESCR.17,K.Rajendran v. State of Tamil Nadu (1982) 2 SCC 273, para.34, p.294.18, Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed under P & T Department v. Union of India (1988) 1 SCC 122 at paras.7 and 9.

Similar orders were made in Dharwad P.W.D. Employees Association v. State of Karnataka (1990) 2 SCC 396; Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority (1991) 1 SCC 28; Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union (1997) 9 SCC 425.19, (1984) 3 SCC 161.20, Ibid., para.10, p.183. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v.

Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986) 3 SCC 227, the court held a hire and fire policy of a government corporation to be untenable as it would be inconsistent with the DPSP.21, Article 42 provides for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. Article 39(e) asks the state to direct its policy towards securing that citizens are not by economic necessity forced into avocations unsuited to their age and strength.22,

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241.23, National Textile Workers Union v.P.R. Ramakrishnan (1983) 1 SCC 249.24, Shanti Star Builders v. Narayan K. Totame (1990) 1 SCC 520. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 177, the court recognized the right of rescued bonded labor to accommodation as part of their rehabilitation, but the enforcement of the judgments in relation to bonded labor is still a distant dream.25,

(1985) 3 SCC 545.26, (1989) 1 SCC 101.27, (1989) 4 SCC 155.28, (1997) 11 SCC 123 29, Ibid., para.13, p.133 30, See Francis Coralie Mullin, note 3 above; Parmanand Katara v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 286.31, Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity v. State of West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37.32,

1995) 3 SCC 42.33, Vincent Pannikulangura v. Union of India (1987) 2 SCC 165; Drug Action Forum v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 609; All India Democratic Women Association v. Union of India 1998 (2) SCALE 360. For PIL cases seeking to enforce fundamental rights of the mentally ill, see Rakesh Chandra Narayan v.

Union of India, 1991 Supp. (2) 626, 1989 Supp. (1) SCC 644, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 478; Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1994) 5 SCC 27, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 489; Sheela Barse v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 204.34, State of Punjab v.

• Ram Lubhaya Bagga (1998) 4 SCC 117, para.29, p.130.35,
• 1992) 3 SCC 666.36,
• 1993) 1 SCC 645.37,
• Ibid., paras.172, 181 and 183, p.733.38,
• Ibid., paras.181 and 182, p.737.39,
• Ibid., para.183, p.738.40,M.C.Mehta v.
• State of Tamil Nadu (1996) 6 SCC 772, para.31 4 1,
• The DPSP regarding equal pay for equal work (Article 39) has had always to be projected in the context of discrimination under article 14 to merit recognition and enforceability.

See Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 618.42,B. Krishna Bhat v. Union of India (1990) 3 SCC 65. Here the PIL petitioner sought enforcement of a prohibition policy basing his claim entirely on article 47. The plea was not entertained.43,M.C. Mehta v.
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Is education a fundamental right in the world?

Education is a basic human right that works to raise men and women out of poverty, level inequalities and ensure sustainable development. But worldwide 244 million children and youth are still out of school for social, economic and cultural reasons. Education is one of the most powerful tools in lifting excluded children and adults out of poverty and is a stepping stone to other fundamental human rights.

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What are the 7 fundamental rights of India explain?

Right To Freedom – The Right to Freedom is covered in Article 19 to 22, with the view of guaranteeing individual rights that were considered vital by the framers of the Constitution, and these Articles also include certain restrictions that may be imposed by the State on individual liberty under specified conditions.

1. Article 19 guarantees six freedoms in the nature of civil rights, which are available only to citizens of India.
2. These include the freedom of speech and expression, freedom of assembly without arms, freedom of association, freedom of movement throughout the territory of our country, freedom to reside and settle in any part of the country of India and the freedom to practice any profession.

All these freedoms are subject to reasonable restrictions that may be imposed on them by the State, listed under Article 19 itself. The grounds for imposing these restrictions vary according to the freedom sought to be restricted and include national security, public order, decency and morality, contempt of court, incitement to offences and defamation.

1. The State is also empowered, in the interests of the general public to nationalize any trade, industry or service to the exclusion of the citizens.
2. The freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 are further sought to be protected by Articles 20–22.
3. The scope of these articles, particularly with respect to the doctrine of due process, was heavily debated by the Constituent Assembly.

It was argued, especially by Benegal Narsing Rau, that the incorporation of such a clause would hamper social legislation and cause procedural difficulties in maintaining order, and therefore it ought to be excluded from the Constitution altogether.

• The Constituent Assembly in 1948 eventually omitted the phrase “due process” in favor of “procedure established by law”.
• As a result, Article 21, which prevents the encroachment of life or personal liberty by the State except in accordance with the procedure established by law, was, until 1978, construed narrowly as being restricted to executive action.

However, in 1978, the Supreme Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India extended the protection of Article 21 to legislative action, holding that any law laying down a procedure must be just, fair and reasonable, and effectively reading due process into Article 21.

In the same case, the Supreme Court also ruled that “life” under Article 21 meant more than a mere “animal existence”; it would include the right to live with human dignity and all other aspects which made life “meaningful, complete and worth living”. Subsequent judicial interpretation has broadened the scope of Article 21 to include within it a number of rights including those to livelihood, good health, clean environment, water, speedy trial and humanitarian treatment while imprisoned.

The right to education at elementary level has been made one of the Fundamental Rights under Article 21A by the 86th Constitutional amendment of 2002. Article 20 provides protection from conviction for offences in certain respects, including the rights against ex post facto laws, double jeopardy and freedom from self-incrimination,

Article 22 provides specific rights to arrested and detained persons, in particular the rights to be informed of the grounds of arrest, consult a lawyer of one’s own choice, be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest, and the freedom not to be detained beyond that period without an order of the magistrate.

The Constitution also authorizes the State to make laws providing for preventive detention, subject to certain other safeguards present in Article 22. The provisions pertaining to preventive detention were discussed with scepticism and misgivings by the Constituent Assembly, and were reluctantly approved after a few amendments in 1949.
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Which article of Indian Constitution is related to education as a fundamental right?

Creating inclusive spaces for all – All private schools must set aside 25% of their seats for children from socially and economically disadvantaged areas, according to the Right to Education Act of 2009. The Act’s clause promoting social inclusion aims to create a more equitable and just society. Articles 21A and 30(1) are both essentially about the Right to Education, although they take different approaches to that right. Every child has the right to the former as an individual whereas minorities only have the latter as a collective right. It is important to determine where the two pieces are complementary to one another, where they are competing with one another or contradicting one another, and to what extent.

• In cases like Re Kerala Education Bill (1958), Saint Xavier College v.
• State of Gujarat (1974), Saint Stephen’s College v.
• University of Delhi (1991), T.M.A.
• Pai Foundation v.
• State of Karnataka (2002), and Islamic Academy of Education v.
• State of Karnataka (2003), the Supreme Court has discussed the nature of the right guaranteed by Article 30(1) on numerous occasions.

In Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014), the constitutional bench of the Supreme Court focused only on the issue of whether aided or unaided minority educational institutions are required to provide ‘free and compulsory education’ to ‘all,’ i.e., free education to 25% of the students in the nation.

1. However, every time the issue was only related to the extent to which various government regulations may penetrate into the right to ‘administer’ minority educational institutions.
2. However, the right to ‘create’ minority educational institutions was not addressed.
3. How minority groups can create educational institutions has never received the amount of attention it deserves.

Every child in India, regardless of caste, class, creed, or religion, has the right to a primary education under Article 21A of the Indian Constitution. Each child has a right that cannot be waived since the idea of waiver does not often apply to fundamental rights.

However, because minor children between the ages of 6 and 14 are the focus of Article 21A, the State has an even stronger obligation to uphold children’s Right to an Education. The type of education guaranteed by Article 21A is elementary-level fundamental education and is the most significant feature of the Act of 2009 as well.

It is not intended to be a religious or specialised education of any type. The Supreme Court stipulated i n Re Kerala Education Bill (1958) that Article 30(1) states and means that linguistic and religious minorities should be allowed to open educational institutions of their choice.

The disciplines that can be taught in these educational facilities are not constrained in any way. Due to the fact that minorities will typically want to raise their children effectively, qualify them for higher education, and send them into the world with the intellectual skills necessary to enter the public sector, the educational institutions of their choice will inevitably include secular general educational institutions as well.

In other words, the Article leaves it up to the minorities to choose educational institutions that will serve both ends, namely, the preservation of their religion, language, or culture, as well as the end of providing their children with a complete high-quality general education.

• The next thing to keep in mind is that the Article explicitly grants two rights to all minorities, regardless of whether they are based on language or religion, namely, the right to create and the right to run educational institutions of their choice.
• It is abundantly obvious that the Constitution contains no specific limitations, but the legal interpretation of the document has not yet produced a binding ruling requiring minorities to establish institutions that might fulfil both objectives.

The Supreme Court made (2002) the assumption that most minorities would want their children to have both religion and modern education in order to raise respectable citizens. However, their comments fell out of line with reputable advice. This is the reason why the Supreme Court’s directions have not been put into practice at the local level.

It is clear that up until recently, Madrassahs were regarded as educational institutions in Maharashtra by the Maharashtra government’s order designating “Madrassahs not teaching conventional courses” as non-schools. Many other states, including West Bengal, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh, are experiencing a similar predicament.

Article 21A’s goal of ensuring that children receive basic education is violated by the state’s recognition of such educational facilities as schools. Every child has the right to get a fundamental education for at least 12 years to provide the groundwork for their personality and intelligence.

1. Numerous Islamic sects in India are operating these Madrassahs, which offer both secular education and religious instruction to students from all backgrounds.
2. However, certain Islamic religious groups in India claim that Madrassahs are closed to students from other groups because they are only intended to produce Islamic religious experts.

These organisations receive financial assistance from the state as a result of their position as minority-run educational institutions. Article 29(2) of the Indian Constitution states that no citizen of India may be denied entrance to educational institutions managed by the state or that receive funding from the state, and such minority schools, therefore, are obviously operating in contravention of this provision.

The Supreme Court ruled in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India in 2014 that the Right to Education Act of 2009 cannot force minority educational institutions to admit students from other communities in order to uphold the state’s goal of providing ‘free’ and ‘compelled’ education to ‘all.’ The Court, however, reaffirmed that the state can use regulatory measures to affect all educational institutions, including aided and unaided minority educational institutions.

In Pramati’s case, the Supreme Court upheld its earlier rulings stating that institutions providing aided or unaided minority education can be subject to regulatory measures required to designate such an institution as an “educational institution”. The Supreme Court’s views, which are summarised above, make it quite evident that the rights granted to religious minorities by Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution are not unqualified.

The fundamental and guiding ideals of our Constitution, such as equality and secularism, govern this right. Therefore, such regulatory measures are constitutionally permissible if they are implemented in schools that are associated with all religions in order to check the quality of religious instruction that is to be offered to the pupils.

In this approach, it is possible to harmoniously interpret both the individual rights of children and the collective rights of the minority population, which may be advantageous for the entire nation. Thus, institutions of all religions that only offer religious instruction to children younger than 14 years of age, should be outlawed outright since they are violating Article 21A’s guarantee that children have the right to basic education.

According to a thorough investigation of the human capital theory, education significantly affects the productivity of the economy by raising factor production per worker. Plans for long-term economic development are centred on education and the development of human resources. Girls who feel unsafe and insecure also stop attending school.

Boys attend school in the afternoon after girls do in the morning. Senior students frequently say that the boys follow them home after school while they are being teased. Due to the arousal of several complaints surrounding such events, police officers were appointed for patrolling, when the girls got out of school.

• However, as soon as there were fewer police officers, the boys kept harassing the girls.
• Because their parents thought it was no longer safe to send their daughters to school, many girls dropped out eventually.
• The issue still exists despite repeated reports to the police and SMC members.
• A well-educated woman can give her children a better lifestyle and access to better healthcare by realising the value of education for future generations.

In addition, educating girls will significantly lower the rates of infant and maternal mortality, child marriages, and domestic and sexual abuse in households. A girl with higher education is also more likely to take part in political debates, meetings, and decision-making that results in the creation of a more democratic and representative government.

New standards for the health, cleanliness, security and safety of kids in both private and public schools have been released by the NCPCR. The new recommendations stress that girls need to learn about menstrual hygiene and receive help so they don’t skip class. Additionally, they state that schools must have a zero-tolerance policy for any issue involving child sexual abuse and that lawbreakers will face harsh punishment.

The Rajasthan High Court in a landmark decision of School Development Management v. State of Rajasthan (2022) while contemplating the Right to Free and Primary Education, observed that Article 21A of the Constitution does not “ensure” the right to obtain education in one’s “mother tongue or home language.” However, a single judge bench led by Justice Dinesh Mehta ruled that the Rajasthan government’s decision to convert Shri Hari Singh Government Senior Secondary School in Peelwa, Jodhpur district, to an English medium school in September 2021 is void because it violates Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution which guarantees the Freedom of Speech and Expression.
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Grady A. Lowry