How Many Years Is Law School To Be A Judge?


How Many Years Is Law School To Be A Judge
Three years A: To earn a position of a judge, it takes four years of undergrad education, three years of law school, and typically two or more years of actively practicing law as a lawyer.
View complete answer

How to be a good judge?

The main relevant characteristics listed that would ensure access to justice are: impartiality, independence, rationality, fairness, reasonableness, and having a good knowledge of the law.
View complete answer

How do you become a judge in New York?

In order to be eligible to be appointed as a judge, you must be admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York for at least 10 years and must be in good standing. In addition, you must be a current resident, or be willing to move to New York City in the event of your appointment.
View complete answer

Who is the youngest judge at the age of 21?

21-Year-Old From Jaipur Set To Become India’s Youngest Judge How Many Years Is Law School To Be A Judge “I could appear in the exam only because the minimum age was reduced,” Mayank Singh said. Jaipur: Mayank Pratap Singh from Jaipur has made history by cracking the Rajasthan judicial services 2018 exam at just 21 years of age, which is set to make him the youngest judge in the country.

“I am elated with my success and I thank my family, teachers and all well-wishers for their contribution which helped me crack the exam in the first attempt,” he added.The original age requirement for appearing in the judicial services exam was 23 years, which was reduced to 21 years by the Rajasthan High Court this year.Mr Singh said that it was a good move as it would help fill vacancies of the posts lying vacant and said it would also help him help more people throughout his career.

“I could appear in the exam only because the minimum age was reduced. Had it not been so then I would not have been eligible. I think it will benefit me because now I will get more time to learn and do more work and serve more people in my career because I joined at such a young age,” he added. : 21-Year-Old From Jaipur Set To Become India’s Youngest Judge
View complete answer

Why is it easy to judge?

The Real Reason we Judge Other People (& What it Says about Us)

  • The Real Reason we Judge Other People (& What it Says About Us).
  • When we judge, does it reflect others or us?
  • Is there a judgment about judging?

We all judge. We are predisposed to this natural tendency; it is part of human nature. But why do we judge? “Thinking is difficult, that’s why most people judge.” ~ Carl Jung This quote sums it up all. Judging is easy and doesn’t require much thinking or reasoning.

Our brains are wired to make automatic judgments about others’ behaviours so that we can move through the world without spending much time or energy in understanding everything we see. Understanding is harder as it requires deep thinking, patience, compassion, and an open mind. Human behaviour specialist Dr John Demartini refers to this phenomenon as “self-righteous” and “self-wrongeous.” Judging is simply our attempt to create a hierarchy of better than and less than, superior to and inferior to, and to define worth to everyone and everything that we meet.

We have the innate urge to be right, to be better, to be superior—always. Our binary view of the world around us necessitates us to be either right or wrong, so we tend to judge.

  1. Here are two theories in psychology that explain the phenomenon of judging:
  2. Attribution Theory
  3. “It’s not whether you win or lose, it’s how you place the blame.” ~ Oscar Wilde

Humans are motivated to assign causes to their actions and behaviours. In social psychology, attribution is the process by which individuals explain the causes of behaviour and events. Attributions are thoughts we have about others that help us make sense of why people do the things they do.

  • Projection (Seeing Our Darkness in Others)
  • “Knowing your own darkness is the best method for dealing with the darkness in other people.” ~ Carl Jung
  • As per Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung, “Although our conscious minds are avoiding our own flaws, they still want to deal with them on a deeper level, so we magnify those flaws in others.”

We can only see in others what we have inside ourselves. First, we reject, then we project. Jung stated our shadow as the unknown, unconscious, dark side of our personality. According to Jung, the shadow—being instinctive and irrational—is prone to psychological projection in which perceived personal inferiority is recognized as a perceived moral deficiency in someone else.

American-British psychologist Raymond Cattell, known for his psychometric research, identified 16 factors or dimensions of personality that we all possess. All of our personalities are actually made up of the same traits; we differ only in the degree to which each trait is expressed. According to Cattell, people simply express these traits in different ways, at different times, and in different areas of their lives.

Some may be dominant, and some may be dormant.

  1. When we judge someone for something, we are actually judging ourselves as the very same thing; we just haven’t fully owned or accepted that trait yet within us.
  2. When we judge, does it reflect others or ourselves?
  3. “When you judge others, you do not define them, you define yourself.” ~ Earl Nightingale

The world around us is our mirror, and judging someone does not define who they are—it defines who we are. More often than not, the things we detest and judge in others are a reflection of the things we cannot accept about ourselves. The yardstick we use for ourselves is the yardstick we use for the world.

The way you measure yourself is how you measure others, and how you assume others measure you. “If you hate a person, you hate something in him that is part of yourself. What isn’t part of ourselves doesn’t disturb us.” ~ Hermann Hesse Everything that irritates us about others can lead us to an understanding of ourselves, a self-awareness.

What we see in others is quite often what we see in ourselves, and what irritates us in others maybe what we don’t like in ourselves. Judging is relative, our constant comparison or validation of everything that we perceive with what we believe. Our beliefs may have been a function of our own personality traits, our conditioning (at multiple levels like societal, cultural, or religious), and our life experiences.

  • Judging shuts us down and prevents us from understanding the full situation or a new truth that is not known yet.
  • “Through judging, we separate. Through understanding, we grow” ~ Doe Zantamata
  • While judging, one gets stuck in a loop; one can evolve by consciously trying to escape that loop. Here are a few ways to do that:

Be Open. Before we judge, let us seek to understand with an open mind. Be Curious. We can remain in curiosity, knowing that there is something about the situation that we may not fully understand. Be Empathetic. Let us be empathetic and give the benefit of the doubt to others for their situation or the circumstances that may not be in our full awareness.

Be Self-Aware. Practice being self-aware through self-forgiveness, self-acceptance, and self-compassion. The more we understand ourselves, the more we can understand others; knowing our tendencies will help us assess fairly, patiently, compassionately. It’s unwise to say, “Stop judging others,” as all our attempts against our innate human nature may go in vain, as it’s not as straightforward as it appears.

Instead, we can learn to become more self-aware when we judge, and through that awareness, move on to adopt more interesting thought patterns. We can also be more appreciative and compassionate of the world around us for what it is, rather than trying to fit it into our optics.
View complete answer

What is the personality of a judge?

A Crash Course in Human Temperament – Core principles of human temperament, summarized here, provide the compass for that search. Let’s start by thinking of a family that has two biological children, close in age and raised in a similar home environment.

These children are, from birth, extremely different in how they tend to act in and react to the world. These patterns of action and reaction are traits, and each child’s bundle of traits is their temperament, Temperament is divided along two trait axes. The first is emotional reactivity (also called “trait emotionality”), which refers to early-appearing, durable patterns of emotional attitudes, experiences, and reactions.

The second is self-regulation (also called “effortful control”), which refers to similarly deep and durable patterns of managing emotions, impulses, and behavior. One child, for example, may startle easily when encountering something new (e.g., a clown at a birthday party) and have difficulty self-soothing, while the other reacts with curiosity and easily calms when upset.

Traits are like dimmer switches: Every person sits somewhere on a continuum for every trait. The poor self-soother, for example, is not utterly incapable of self-regulation; she just sits low on the regulatory continuum. The combination of one’s positions on trait continua creates a relatively stable, distinct temperamental profile, which then interacts with situations to produce behavior.

The line between temperament and behavior is particularly direct when the person is under stress, and where there are few salient constraints to motivate acting differently. Thus, both children are capable of a wide variety of behaviors, depending on the situation, but their parents know which form each child’s center of gravity.

Those are the ones most rooted in temperament. These reactivity and regulation traits are the “building blocks that underlie development of individual differences in personality” as an adult.10 Environment plays a crucial role: “different life histories create different personalities” even “in children born with the same temperament.” 11 Over time, temperament both shapes and is shaped by many factors — culture; family dynamics; friendships; financial security; differential expectations according to variables such as gender and race; exposure to illness and violence; and so on.

Some early-appearing traits will persist through the forge of our formative years and others will not, and how they persist will vary. However, the range of change is not infinite: ne’s temperament imposes a restraint on the possible outcomes. A low-reactive infant might become a trial lawyer, investment banker, navy pilot, or criminal, but it is unlikely that he will become a frightened recluse.

Condensed water vapor can, depending on local conditions, form a white billowy cloud, a mackerel sky, or a dense ground fog, but it cannot become an asteroid.12 Temperament “eliminates many more possibilities than it determines,” creating an “envelope of possibility” within which we all, by adulthood, will have developed.13 The grown-up iteration of our temperament will be just one aspect (if a particularly important one) of a complex, varied personality.14 Further, that temperamental aspect can continue to grow and change within our remaining envelope of possibility.

However, growth curves will have flattened significantly, particularly by middle age; certain types of change will be easier and more predictable than others (for example, emotional regulation skill tends to tick upward in older adults); and dramatic change will be just as unlikely as it ever was.

Finally, many of our distinguishing qualities are not part of temperament and personality at all, such as intelligence, learned skills, “acquired knowledge, opinions, beliefs.” 15 When our hypothetical siblings (now in middle age) argue over partisan politics at the Thanksgiving table, the content of that argument is not temperamental.

How they argue, however, and how each recovers from the argument, is. Here is where our crash course in human temperament leaves us as we prepare to turn our attention squarely back to its implications for judges. We (fortunately) do not need to examine judges’ childhoods to understand judicial temperament.

  1. We have both the luxury and the necessity of looking at the person who either wants to be a judge or already is one, and that person is likely approaching, in, or past middle age.
  2. That person will come with a relatively stable temperamental profile, seen through “individual differences in the tendency to behave, think, and feel in certain ways,” 16 which has emerged through their life experiences, as bounded by their envelope of possibility.

A judge’s temperament might change somewhat over a judicial career but cannot be expected to change fundamentally. Each judge’s temperament will interact with a distinct judicial environment — the specific parameters of their job, the sorts of situations that typify it, and the cultures (both courthouse and community) within which it is embedded — to produce behaviors.

Temperament’s behavioral influence is likely to be particularly visible when judges are in stressful situations with few salient constraints on behavior. Finally, judges are more than their temperaments. They have particular levels of intellect and legal training, political and judicial philosophies, career goals, spiritual beliefs, moral commitments, and family lives.

When we look at a judge as a whole package, that whole package matters. But when we look to his or her judicial temperament, we are looking at the part of the package that maps onto psychological concepts of temperament. That part is real, it is predictive of behavior, and it is only imperfectly malleable.

  1. The importance of judicial temperament has not eluded us — but its precise nature has, because we haven’t used the appropriate tools to understand it.
  2. Let’s now dig deeper, focusing on the specific traits that would be predicted to be most and least likely to produce desired behaviors in judging environments.

Imagine that the two children have grown up and become judges. One day they are in their respective courtrooms, each interacting with a lawyer who makes an argument after being instructed not to. One judge, furious at being disobeyed, barks sharply, startling everyone, then quickly feels embarrassed and mumbles at the lawyer to continue with a different argument.

  1. The other judge, mildly disappointed in the lawyer’s ineptitude, calmly halts the proceeding, talks quietly but firmly in a sidebar, and waits to see if the behavior repeats.
  2. In both courtrooms, court staff exchange knowing looks: This is how their judge usually acts when things like that happen.
  3. Their predictably contrasting reactions to, and handling of, similar situations likely reflect temperamental differences in both reactivity and self-regulation.

Emotional reactivity traits Recall that one temperamental axis is emotional reactivity, capturing both the speed and intensity with which one reacts to stimuli — for example, something novel or frightening — and the content of those reactions — for instance, feelings of anger, sadness, fear, or joy.

Certain emotionality traits are likely to promote desired judicial behaviors, while others are likely to do the opposite. Positive emotionality is a plus. Judges with strength in the “positive emotionality” family of traits would be predicted to display desirable judicial behaviors — expressions of compassion, patience, humility, respect, and open-mindedness — most consistently and in the greatest variety of work settings.

Persons high in positive emotionality tend with relative ease to connect with feelings such as pleasure, joy, interest, and excitement. They may gravitate toward lower-intensity versions (e.g., calm satisfaction) or higher intensity ones (e.g., exuberance and sensation-seeking).

In either iteration, positivity buffers against depression, promotes resilience and longevity, and enhances social competence. Further, dispositionally positive persons tend to have a broadened perspective on their own thoughts and actions, as well as those of others, in contrast to the “narrowed mindsets sparked by negative emotions.” 17 Kindness is part of this trait family.

Trait kindness refers not to specific acts, which may not be appropriate in any given situation, but rather to a deep-seated “constellation of positive attitudes, feelings, and behaviors toward others,” including compassion, “empathy, prosocial behavior, generosity, and altruism.” 18 One might think of this trait as measuring differential tendencies to approach the world with agape, or love for humanity.

  1. Moderate to high levels of temperamental positivity, including kindness, should be understood as critical determinants of a good judicial temperament.
  2. High-positivity judges will not feel happy, hopeful, and generous at all times, nor should they.
  3. These would be abnormal reactions to many situations — particularly in judging, which usually requires mucking about in some sort of unhappiness or acrimony, ranging from broken families to broken contracts.
You might be interested:  What Is A 2.0 Gpa In High School?

Positivity will not bathe sad or conflictual realities in golden sunshine. However, strength in positivity traits would be expected to buffer against judicial cynicism and despair. The work of judging often shows humanity at its worst. To perform that work well over time requires a fundamental disposition to believe in humanity’s essential decency, and a propensity to care about the public being served.

  • Indeed, tributes to great judges typically praise their benevolence.
  • One much-beloved judge wrote that “f we judges could possess but one attribute, it should be a kind and understanding heart.
  • The bench is no place for cruel or callous people regardless of their other qualities and abilities.” 19 In the words of another, “a judge is more likely to reach a just answer if he or she cares.” 20 Caring does not mean giving everyone what they want (seldom possible), or giving the most sympathetic party what they want.

A caring judge will identify and take more opportunities to act prosocially than would judges with lesser levels of this trait, but salient environmental constraints always impose limits. A high-kindness judge will forego certain kind acts — such as forgiving a poor family’s crushing debt — if doing so would violate their sense of legal obligation, fairness, and ethics.

However, that judge is likely still to treat the parties with respect, express compassion for the debtor, and explain why she cannot grant that relief. Those actions also are kind, and they benefit both the debtor and the courts. The procedural-justice values we hope a good judicial temperament will promote have a home in this set of traits.

Positivity also would be expected to heighten a judge’s work satisfaction and self-care. This judge is likely to take pleasure where he or she can, from days that feel like a triumph — persuading appellate colleagues to adopt a cherished position, or reuniting a child with a family — to ordinary ones involving the smallest of victories — clearing one’s six-month list, say, or closing a case after a basically fair settlement.

  1. When things are hard and the judge falls short, he may still be able to think, “well, I did my best, and tomorrow’s another day.” Frustrations, sadness, and conflict abound in judging, and positivity and caring build a precious commodity: resilience.
  2. In selecting, evaluating, and supporting judges, we therefore should value dispositional positivity, including kindness.

Strength in these traits will help the judge withstand the impact of the job, find available opportunities to do good, and treat people well in the process. Negative emotionality is a minus. In contrast, judges who are moderate to high in the “negative emotionality” family of traits would be predicted to display un desirable judicial behaviors — expressions of disdain, impatience, closed-mindedness, and anger — most consistently and in the greatest variety of judicial work settings.21 Dispositional anger is likely the biggest worry.

It consists of a stable tendency “to attribute hostile intent in others’ actions, to perceive frustration in a variety of situations, and to engage in continuous conscious pondering and rumination over one’s own anger, as well as the perceived provocations of others”; such a profile also entails greater frequency and intensity of mood changes.22 These temperamentally “hostile and argumentative” persons “tend to be vigilant for potential provocation from others, to initiate and sustain arguments when provocation is perceived, and to react angrily when others’ behaviors are viewed as hostile or rejecting.” 23 Their behaviors may beget a downward, self-justifying spiral.

By expressing less warmth, escalating, and engaging in “toxic interpersonal behaviors” like use of “contempt and sarcasm,” such persons create conflictual situations, to which they will then have characteristically exaggerated responses.24 No clever argument is required to drive home this temperamental profile’s destructive potential.25 Judges who regularly indulge in over-the-top anger displays are the frequent-flyers of disciplinary complaints, as are those who use insults, sarcasm, and humiliation to cement their power over lawyers and parties.

These behaviors erode faith in the courts, and the damage does not stop there. Negativity can close minds as surely as positivity can open them. Left unchecked, anger can curtail deliberation and increase punitive behavior, regardless of whether it is relevant or justified — a particular danger for judges who feel it with greater frequency and less justification.

Moreover, high trait anger (that is, being highly prone to anger) is bad for judges’ health and increases substance abuse, affecting both work performance and longevity. Just like the high-kindness judge who denies relief to the sympathetic debtor, the high-anger judge may have internalized reasons why she should act in a manner inconsistent with her own temperament (or “temperament-inconsistent”) — particularly if she is high in self-regulation (on that, more anon).

  • However, trait anger will likely show itself more than we might hope.
  • First, this profile generally entails increased stress reactivity.
  • Stress, which heightens temperament’s impact on behavior, is a recurrent feature of judging; those most affected by it would be expected to act more regularly in a temperament-consistent manner.

Second, anger tends to spur fast, unreflective action. This property is a virtue when the anger is well-placed, proportional, and effective in redressing a harm, but damaging otherwise. Third, anger is an emotion of power. Persons with power (like judges) generally feel more free to express it, particularly when directed against those with less power (like lawyers, parties, and the public).

Anger displays also tend to elevate one’s perceived power, though this is more true for men than women.26 Judges inclined toward anger may find that judging gives them particular license to express it, and (particularly if they are men) may come to enjoy the authority bump it confers. Finally, constraints on even frequent and extreme expressions of anger, frustration, and disdain are few and far between.

Disciplinary proceedings remain rare, and their outcomes often are mild; appellate courts generally are loathe to overturn cases on this basis; and parties are expected to accord judges deference even when they act unreasonably. Temperamental anger, then, represents a strongly negative mark on a judge’s profile, certainly at high levels of anger and likely even at moderate ones.

  • While this is unlikely to come as a surprise, psychology highlights the extent to which such a profile in judges in particular may be both entrenched and dangerous.
  • Psychology also illuminates a less visible, less appreciated temperamental danger zone: high trait fear.
  • This profile involves stable tendencies toward “repressive or inhibitive” emotions such as anxiety, “submissiveness, fear, sorrow, tenderness, and disgust.” 27 None of these feelings is inherently problematic, though they are distressing.

A judge who is not disgusted by child pornography is profoundly out of touch; a healthy fear of retaliatory violence can prompt needed precautions; and some modicum of motivational anxiety is arguably a job requirement.28 The problems come at high, perhaps only the highest, levels of this trait, and that is because a highly fearful profile hinders development of courage.

Although tributes to great judges often laud their courage (like their kindness), courage is not generally thought of as a temperamental quality. This is a serious oversight. Judicial independence requires that judges be willing to rule in ways that make enemies, and that may anger, disappoint, or alienate professional and social peers, powerful constituencies, and fellow government actors.

Lower-court judges should take the possibility of reversal into account, but fearing reversal can stifle the insight and industry that propel law’s development and that give a sense of agency and purpose. Extreme anxiety can paralyze judges when they need to reach decisions and move on.

Fearlessness is not the goal: Courage is the ability to act consistent with one’s goals and values despite reasonable fears. Chronic fearfulness and anxiety can overwhelm that capacity. As Chief Justice Roberts has observed, judging is no job for “timid, souls.” 29 Judging requires courage, and courage is temperamental.

In selecting, evaluating, and supporting judges, therefore, we should be particularly concerned with dispositional negativity. High levels of trait fearfulness threaten something desired just as surely as high levels of trait anger promise something undesired.

*** Let’s take stock. To possess a generally good judicial temperament means, in part, to have a relatively high propensity to experience the emotional states likely to express in desirable behaviors, and a relatively low propensity to experience the emotional states likely to express in undesirable ones.

Judges high in trait positivity are best positioned in this regard. They are more likely to exhibit resilience and open-mindedness; to both feel and project calm and patience; to treat others with respect, understanding, and compassion; and to derive pleasure from accomplishments both large and small.

In contrast, judges high in trait anger are more likely to feel and project anger, irritation, frustration, and contempt; to perceive situations as personally arousing and offensive; and to engage in aggressive and disrespectful behaviors. Those very high in trait fearfulness are less likely to maintain the courage necessary to make difficult decisions and may find it difficult to handle the position’s demands over time.

Emotional regulation traits Having dug deeper into the implications of trait emotionality, let us now examine self-regulation, just as critical to judicial temperament. This second temperamental axis captures the wide variation in judges’ ability to shape their emotional experiences, the thoughts underlying those experiences, and the actions those experiences motivate, in light of judges’ constraints and in service of their objectives.30 The most advantageous profile is simply stated: moderate to high levels of self-regulatory capacity are very good, and low ones are very bad.

Self-regulation is necessary because emotions and the behaviors they motivate are not always in line with our goals. For example, a judge may have to refrain from expressing impatience, amusement, or a host of other emotions in order to satisfy professional norms regarding a calm and impartial demeanor.

Persons high in self-regulation do not invariably seek to tamp down emotion and its expression. Rather, they work flexibly to influence what emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express them, using a variety of strategies — for example, biting one’s tongue, thinking differently about a situation, changing something about that situation, or seeking guidance and support.

Think of the sibling-judge who interpreted the lawyer’s error as ineptitude rather than disrespect, masked his disappointment with a smile, and explained privately rather than barked publicly: These are choices about whether and how to self-regulate. The challenges of judging require a deep bench of these kinds of regulatory choices and skill in their deployment.

A judge may want to refrain from showing emotion in some situations (to prevent observers from seeing what she thinks) but show it in others (to encourage a defendant’s progress in reentry court, or drive home the seriousness of a lawyer’s missteps).

A patient, slow, even-toned response is often just what is needed to calm a tense interaction, but will not cut off an immediate danger, such as a lawyer starting to reference inadmissible material. A judge may want to adopt a caring, soothing tone with one person (a frightened child witness or overwhelmed clerk), but a clinical, cold one with another (an expert witness or appellate advocate who refuses to stay on task).

A difficult telephone call with a colleague (requiring willpower to initiate) may de-escalate a conflict, whereas sending the sharply worded email that was satisfying to draft may do the opposite. Self-regulation is a sophisticated improvisational dance, not one performed by stepping in numbered outlines on the floor.

  1. Every judge needs a moderate to high level of regulatory skill to pull off this dance, and judges weak in this domain will find that regulatory needs outpace capacity.
  2. Such persons tend to rely unreflectively on a narrow set of responses, regardless of their goal-suitedness; to have greater difficulty overriding impulses; and to deploy suboptimal coping mechanisms such as suppression and avoidance.

These differential regulatory patterns impact situational success, personal well-being, and adjustment to the demands of life and work — and those low in regulatory capacity fare worse on each measure. Strength in self-regulation therefore should be prioritized in assessment of judicial temperament.

Putting reactivity and regulation together One may ask whether self-regulation is the more important temperament axis. Imagine our sibling-judge who stands at the ready to snap at perceived displays of disrespect. If she is sufficiently high in self-regulation, we can imagine her noticing that she is about to snap, and instead breathing, deciding to interpret another’s misstep as ineptitude rather than malice, putting on a calm smile, and engaging in the same behavior as her higher-positivity sibling the next courtroom over.

If she is high enough on the regulatory continuum, not only will she in this instance look indistinguishable from her sibling, but her skill could make the difference between burnout and a long, distinguished career. Ultimately, skillful regulation is less effortful, and less costly, than poor regulation.

  • As trait negativity increases, we ideally would require a commensurately higher quantum of regulatory capacity.
  • A sufficient regulatory counterweight could move an otherwise problematic judge into acceptable territory.
  • But there are limits to what we can ask.
  • Consider the common automotive analogy of reactivity as the accelerator and regulation the brake.

More accurately, regulation in this analogy encompasses all the actions that determine a car’s accelerated movements, including steering, downshifting, speeding up, and braking. Brakes wear out when overworked, and no amount of steering (by an amateur, at least) can get a speeding car safely around a tight curve in the rain.

  • Heavy reliance on one half of the temperamental profile to cabin the tendencies of the other may get the job done in discrete instances, but over the course of a judicial career is an off-balance proposition.
  • A judge with a generally advantageous emotional-reactivity profile will need to call on the most effortful forms of self-regulation somewhat less frequently.

Further, the stakes will be lower. Every judge (indeed, every human) experiences regulatory failure when, predictably, stressors exceed coping capacity. For the judge already prone to anger or fear, the negative behaviors that express in such moments of failure would be expected to be more pronounced than those of their temperamentally positive counterpart.

  • More, such a polarized temperament profile is likely to be relatively rare.
  • Persons with lesser trait regulatory skill tend also to have particularly disadvantageous sorts of trait emotionality: those with “the highest levels of anger also have the lowest levels of cognitive self-regulation,” 31 as well as lesser ability to reduce hostile feelings and override impulses to express them.

Strength in the kindness dimension, in contrast, is linked to strength in effortful control. As advantageous reactivity tends to come clustered with advantageous levels of self-regulation, and as the opposite also is true, some judges will be temperamental slam dunks (very high positivity/very high regulatory skill) while others will be air balls (very high negativity/very low regulatory skill).
View complete answer

What is a good judge personality?

Expected Relations between Personality of Judges and Judgmental Accuracy – As mentioned previously, the Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM) describes a four-stage process of accurate judgment ( Funder, 1995, 1999 ). It is important to consider how the personality and behaviors of the judge are likely to affect success at all four stages in order to form a complete picture of how the judge affects the entire judgment process.

  • However, previous work has focused on the last two stages of RAM and not considered how the characteristics and behaviors the judge may influence the first two stages ( Funder, 1995 ).
  • Judges may influence the first two stages, relevance and availability, by making others feel comfortable and able to be themselves so that they will reveal information about themselves that is useful for judging a variety of personality traits.

Judges around whom others feel comfortable might have many of the positive characteristics that have been found to be related to judgmental accuracy, such as being warm, genuine, and sympathetic, and not hostile, anxious, or defensive ( Colvin & Bundick, 2001 ; Kolar, 1995 ; Vogt & Colvin, 2003 ), as well as good social skills and agreeableness.

Furthermore, judges who encourage targets to talk about their thoughts and feelings will likely have more personality-relevant cues available to them ( Anderson, 1984 ; Funder, 1995, 1999 ). Several characteristics of judges could be related to a target’s willingness to talk about thoughts and feelings, some of which have already been found to be related to judgmental accuracy such as having an interpersonal orientation ( Vogt & Colvin, 2003 ), being socially sensitive ( Davis & Kraus, 1997 ), trustful and talkative ( Adams, 1927 ), not anxious or self-defensive ( Kolar, 1995 ), and sympathetic and empathic and not hostile or manipulative ( Colvin & Bundick, 2001 ).

Judges will influence the detection stage by being observant and paying attention to their surroundings rather than being inwardly-focused ( Adams, 1927 ). Engaging in eye contact and seeming interested in what the target has to say are behaviors that may indicate that the judge is attending to the target.

  1. Additionally, targets are more likely to reveal more information about themselves when it appears that their interaction partners are interested in them and paying attention to what they are saying.
  2. Judges will influence the utilization stage by being able to correctly combine and interpret cues.
  3. Judges with high intellectual capacity, including general and social intelligence, are expected to be more successful at this stage because they should be able to remember and successfully manipulate more cues ( Funder, 1999 ).
You might be interested:  How Many Years Of School To Be A Firefighter?

Some research has found support for the idea that intelligence and cognitive complexity are related to judgmental accuracy ( Adams, 1927 ; Christiansen et al., 2005 ; Davis & Kraus, 1997 ; Reimer, Greve & Funder, 2006 ; Kolar, 1995 ; Vernon, 1933 ). Finally, a characteristic that is likely to affect judgmental accuracy at all stages of the judgment process is psychological adjustment ( Davis & Kraus, 1997 ).

Well-adjusted judges are likely to be involved in comfortable interactions in which their partners make relevant information available, to not be focused on themselves and therefore have the ability to detect information, and to have coherent thought patterns and an appropriate view of human nature so that they can successfully utilize cues.

Therefore, characteristics and behaviors that indicate psychological adjustment are expected to be related to judgmental accuracy. Expectations can also be based on other, more general, theories. For example, trait activation theory ( Tett & Guterman, 2000 ) proposes that “personality traits are expressed as responses to trait-relevant situational cues” ( Tett & Burnett, 2003, p.502).

  • A socially skilled and agreeable judge may create the type of situation that allows for the expression of multiple cues that are relevant to personality, and therefore the judge will make more accurate judgments of personality.
  • Theory based on the interpersonal circumplex suggests that people respond in predictable ways to certain behaviors, such as responding to dominance with submission and to affiliation with affiliation ( Markey & Kurtz, 2006 ; Tracey, 2004 ).

It is possible that people may respond to socially skilled behavior with more relevant information about themselves.
View complete answer

What is a judge salary in NYC?

How much does aJudge/Magistrate make in New York? The average Judge/Magistrate salary in New York is $189,321 as of March 28, 2023, but the range typically falls between $185,704 and $211,871, Salary ranges can vary widely depending on the city and many other important factors, including education, certifications, additional skills, the number of years you have spent in your profession. Jobs with a similar salary range to Judge/Magistrate : Hospital Physician Based on HR-reported data: a national average with a geographic differential 25% $185,704 10% $182,411 90% $232,401 75% $211,871 $189,321 50%(Median) Didn’t find job title? Click You may get higher pay by adjusting the following factors: Check out Judge/Magistrate jobs in New York For Employers Blogs That May Help You For Employees
View complete answer

What is the age limit for a judge in New York?

Raise the Mandatory Judicial Retirement Age – The mandatory retirement age of judges and justices in New York State is 70 years of age except for Supreme Court justices who can be “certificated” to serve for three additional two year terms beyond 70 until the year in which they reach 76.

  1. Modern Courts has supported increasing the retirement age of judges and justices in the past given that the current mandatory retirement age of 70 was enacted in the Constitution in 1869 when the average life expectancy was below 50 years of age; today it exceeds age 80 in New York State.
  2. Many individuals who have reached the age of 70 have a substantial number of productive years ahead of them and many states and the federal judiciary permit judges to serve past the age of 70.

Modern Courts previously supported a Constitutional amendment to raise the judicial retirement age on a limited basis – 80 years old for only Court of Appeals judges and Supreme Court justices. It should be noted that this Proposal was rejected by the voters in November 2013.
View complete answer

Do judges have to be lawyers in NY?

ASSISTANCE FOR TOWN AND VILLAGE JUSTICES Enhanced Training for Non-Lawyer Justices There are approximately 3,150 judges and justices of the New York State Unified Court System. Approximately 1,830 are justices of town and village courts, while around 1,320 serve on higher courts: city, county, family, surrogate, supreme and appellate.

  1. Judges of the higher courts serve full-time and are paid by state-appropriated funds administered by the Office of Court Administration and are sometimes referred to collectively as “state-paid” judges.
  2. Town and village court justices serve part-time and are paid by their individual local governments, typically at a small fraction of the salaries given to state-paid judges.

Collectively, the town and village courts throughout New York State hear approximately two million cases a year, such as speeding tickets and driving while intoxicated, small claims, landlord-tenant proceedings and misdemeanors. Town and village court justices may also preside at the arraignment of defendants charged with most felonies, set bail and issue or deny orders of protection.

Notwithstanding their significant judicial authority, the diffuse and localized structure of the town and village courts means, among other things, that they are locally financed and operated, do not have the same ready access to the resources of the Office of Court Administration that the rest of the court system enjoys, and indeed are not subject to OCA’s direct supervision or control.

While OCA provides them with significant assistance, as discussed below, the successful operation of these courts depends on the resources available to them locally, which vary widely. Town and village court justices are the only judges in New York State who do not have to be lawyers admitted to the practice of law.

Of the roughly 1,830 presently in office, approximately 700 have gone to law school. The rest, i.e. the non-lawyers, are often referred to as “lay justices.” This system of local magistrates, which harkens back to the colonial era when lawyers were relatively few and far between, is not unique to New York.

Numerous other states, such as Texas, Arizona, Nevada, Colorado, Louisiana, South Carolina and Mississippi, have non-lawyer justices presiding in certain lower courts. There is no distinction in New York between the lay or law-trained town or village justices as to the types of cases they may hear.

Any town or village court justice, regardless of educational background, may preside over the matters typically within the jurisdiction of such courts, such as traffic cases, small claims, eviction proceedings, misdemeanors and violations. A landmark case before the Court of Appeals held that, while a defendant is constitutionally entitled to receive a fundamentally fair trial, a defendant charged in a town court with a crime was not entitled under New York or federal law to have the case heard by a law-trained judge, having asserted no other cause for transferring the case to another judge.

People v Charles F., 60 NY2d 474 (1983). See also, People v Skrynski, 42 NY2d 218 (1977); North v Russell, 427 US 328 (1976). At various times, the Legislature has been asked to consider amending the constitution to require all town and village justices be lawyers, or to replace the town and village court system with a network of regional or district courts made up of fewer judges, all of whom would be law-trained and serve full-time.

While such proposals have never been effectuated, in 2006-2007 the Legislature, the Office of Court Administration (OCA) and the State Magistrates Association (SMA) made a significant commitment to enhance the resources available to the town and village courts and to improve the education and training provided to the justices of those courts.

At the same time, the Legislature significantly increased the resources available to the Commission to enforce the judicial ethics rules, recognizing among other things that 70% of the disciplinary decisions rendered by the Commission involve town and village justices, and 80% or more of those involve lay justices.

As part of the regimen devised in 2006-2007, OCA implemented an Action Plan for the Justice Courts, 1 which among other things provided for broader and increased attention to judicial education and a laptop computer with audio recording capability for each court to make an electronic record of all proceedings.

OCA and the SMA developed a more extensive annual education and training curriculum, in which representatives of the Commission and the Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics routinely participate with the goal of preventing violations of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.

OCA created an Office of Justice Court Support that provides guidance and maintains a call line for town and village justices who seek assistance; it produced and updates an invaluable Justice Court Manual that offers best practices and advice on how to manage the courts; 2 and it makes readily available other significant resources, such as its Guide to Small Claims.3 OCA is also introducing uniform case and financial reporting software to the computer systems of the town and village courts, to assist in the proper management and remittal of court-collected funds.

These and other steps have helped to improve the overall administration of justice in the town and village courts. The Commission has found overall that town and village justices are capable in the discharge of their duties and conscientious in their adherence to the judicial code of ethics.

Yet the Commission has also encountered more disciplinary issues with town and village justices than with judges of the higher courts. Town and village justices account for 70% of the Commission’s disciplines, which at various times over the years has been more or less close to their overall percentage of the state’s judiciary, which has ranged from 67% to 59%.4 Over the last decade, while only 20% of the complaints received by the Commission were against town and village justices, 59% of the Commission’s investigations and 72% of its public decisions (120 out of 167) involved town and village justices, indicating that ethics complaints against them are more likely to have merit.

Of those 120 public decisions rendered against town and village justices, 90 ( i.e.75%) were against lay justices. It has been the Commission’s experience that many lay justices comport themselves and discharge their adjudicative responsibilities in such a manner as to seem indistinguishable from their law-trained counterparts.

It is also true, however, that lay justices are more likely than law-trained justices to violate promulgated mandates to respect, comply with, be faithful to and be professionally competent in the law, in some instances because they do not appreciate certain nuances or even fundamental legal precepts that their law-trained colleagues are likely to know.

For example, the Commission has rendered public decisions as to lay justices who repeatedly failed to advise litigants of such fundamental mandates as the right to counsel and the right to assigned counsel if indigent; or did not allow the parties a fair opportunity to be heard before rendering decision; or required the defense to present their case first; or ordered an eviction or rendered a default judgment without ascertaining that the missing party had been served with notice of the complaint and the court date; or delayed unreasonably in deciding a motion due to unfamiliarity with the law or procedure at issue.5 The Commission is available to work with the Legislature and the courts to improve the overall performance of town and village justices in this regard.

  • We would be pleased to help design and teach more expansive courses in civil procedure, criminal procedure, property (with a concentration on landlord/tenant) and professional ethics, akin to the rigorous classes in these subjects that justices who are attorneys would have taken in law school.
  • The Judge’s Fiduciary Obligations The Commission has commented in numerous Annual Reports, most recently last year, on recurring problems associated with the fiduciary responsibilities unique to town and village court justices.

Throughout the state, in all but the town and village courts, funds collected by the court are handled by professional administrative personnel or other non-judicial staff. In the town and village courts, however, that responsibility rests with the individual justices, who are typically assisted by a court clerk who may only serve part-time.

  • Yet neither judge nor clerk is likely to be trained as an accountant or experienced in auditing or financial best practices.
  • Fines, fees and bail collected by town or village court justices must by law be deposited promptly into official court bank accounts.
  • All fines, fees and forfeited bail must also be reported and remitted in a timely manner to the State Comptroller and the town or village’s chief fiscal officer, respectively.

While improper financial management and record keeping most often results from honest mistakes, inattention or insufficient clerical assistance, they sometimes indicate serious misconduct, either by the judge or by the court staff in whom the judge has reposed significant responsibility to track the court’s finances.

  1. The Commission has publicly disciplined approximately 80 town and village justices for significant violations of the various rules regarding the handling of court funds.
  2. Approximately 140 other judges have been cautioned for relatively minor violations of the applicable standards.
  3. When a judge fails to deposit court funds for long periods of time, or deposits less money than was collected since the previous deposit, suspicions of wrongdoing inevitably arise, as they do by such financial irregularities as lengthy delays in filing reports of receipts with the State Comptroller and in remitting court funds to the town or village’s chief fiscal officer, large deficiencies (or surpluses) in the court account, negligence in failing to safeguard such funds, and failing to keep adequate records of court finances.

“Carelessness in handling public moneys is a serious violation of official responsibilities” and a “breach of the public’s trust” which may warrant removal from office. Matter of Petrie, 54 NY2d 807, 808 (1981); see also Matter of Rater, 69 NY2d 208 (1987); Matter of Vincent, 70 NY2d 208 (1987).

  • In Matter of Cooley, 53 NY2d 64 (1981), the Court of Appeals also noted that a judge’s willful failure to make appropriate entries in court records, such as a docket book and cashbook, is a serious violation of the judge’s administrative responsibilities, and may be punishable as a misdemeanor.
  • Even where venality is not an issue, the judge’s negligence may still require public discipline because, as the Court said in Matter of Murphy, 82 NY2d 491, 494 (1993), “the mishandling of public money by a judge is serious misconduct even when not done for personal profit.” In recent years, the Commission has become aware of several jurisdictions in which court clerks were prosecuted and convicted for the theft of court funds.

While increased reliance on computers, accounting software, electronic banking and wire transfers has tended to increase the ability to perform audits and reconciliations on the one hand, it has also made it easier for computer-savvy employees to evade oversight by a computer-challenged judge.

  • The Commission reminds town and village justices that it is their responsibility to account for court funds and to certify compliance with applicable financial mandates in reports to the State Comptroller.
  • Where a judge does not perform the financial responsibilities personally, he or she must exercise rigorous oversight of the court staff to whom such responsibilities have been assigned.

That means reviewing the work of staff, performing spot checks to correlate the bail or fine assessed in a case with the amount collected, or periodically initiating an independent audit. Where court staff have been convicted of theft of court funds, the judge may not be publicly disciplined if he or she had made reasonable efforts at oversight but was deceived by a clerk who cleverly hid the evidence of theft.

  1. But the judge who exercises little to no oversight may be subject to public discipline for the failure to supervise that helped facilitate the theft.
  2. The Commission urges town and village court justices to take their fiduciary responsibilities seriously and, when they need help, to consult with their local Supervising Judge, the court system’s Office of Justice Court Support, the State Comptroller’s office and/or the State Magistrates Association.

Dedicated training in accounting and finance, both for justices and court or town clerks, would significantly improve the fiduciary record of the courts and enhance public confidence in the operations of the local courts. The Commission also recommends that the Legislature consider relieving under-staffed and under-resourced town and village justices of the responsibility to collect, deposit and remit all court funds, and perhaps repose such responsibility to a dedicated administrative staff, emulating on a regional basis what the professional staffs in higher courts do in collecting and accounting for bail, fines, fees and other funds.1 2 3 4 At present, the roughly 1,830 town and village justices constitute 59% of the state’s judiciary.

  • That is down from 67% three decades ago, when roughly 2,200 town and village justices comprised 67% of the judiciary.
  • At the same time, the number of law-trained town and village justices increased from around 400 in the 1980s to over 700 in 2018.5 See, Matter of Susan R.
  • Castine, 2019 Annual Report 117; Matter of John M.
You might be interested:  How To Become A High School History Teacher?

Skinner, 2019 Annual Report 239; Matter of Michael R. Clark, 2018 Annual Report 114; Matter of Gene R. Heintz, 2016 Annual Report 111; Matter of Edwin R. Williams, 2016 Annual Report 230; Matter of Joseph Temperato, 2014 Annual Report 217; Matter of Jerome C.
View complete answer

How old is the youngest female judge?

Briony Clarke first joined the bench at 31 ? How Many Years Is Law School To Be A Judge The UK’s youngest ever female judge has bagged herself a promotion, Briony Clarke entered the history books when in 2017, she was sworn in as a deputy district judge on the London and South East circuit at the youthful age (by judicial standards) of just 31. How Many Years Is Law School To Be A Judge Briony Clarke Following her initial appointment to the bench, Legal Cheek was quick to draw readers’ attention to her remarkable legal career. At just 15 Clarke joined Essex outfit Taylor Haldane Barlex LLP (THB) and went on to juggle work and studies, completing her law degree and Legal Practice Course (LPC) at Anglia Ruskin University.

  1. She qualified in 2009, became an accredited solicitor in 2010, an associate at THB in 2013, and a partner just one year later.
  2. There have been a number of fresh-faced judicial appointments in recent years.
  3. Criminal barrister Richard Archer was appointed a recorder at the sprightly age of 32, while Anna Midgley took up her spot on the bench at 33.

Elsewhere, lawyers Ita Farrelly and Adem Muzaffer secured judicial roles aged 32 and 34 respectively. For all the latest commercial awareness info, and advance notification of Legal Cheek’s careers events: Sign up to the Legal Cheek Hub
View complete answer

What is the highest level of judges?

Supreme Court – The Supreme Court is the highest court in the United States. Article III of the U.S. Constitution created the Supreme Court and authorized Congress to pass laws establishing a system of lower courts. In the federal court system’s present form, 94 district level trial courts and 13 courts of appeals sit below the Supreme Court. Learn more about the Supreme Court.
View complete answer

How old is the youngest UK judge?

Exclusive: Carlton Williams called to the bar just three months ago Carlton Williams A civil servant at the Home Office has become what is believed to be the country’s youngest judge. Carlton Williams, who only turned 29 in December, was recently appointed as a judge in the First Tier Tribunal in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber.

  • He will preside over appeals against Home Office decisions relating to permission to stay in the UK, deportation from the UK, and entry clearance to the UK.
  • Williams will leave his current position as a senior presenting officer, a civil service role where he represents the government in immigration appeals.

After leaving school at 16, Williams completed an LLB part-time through the Open University, graduating in 2021. This was followed by a master’s degree at The University of Law which he completed last year. He was only called to the bar in November 2022.

  1. Williams describes the appointment as overwhelming, saying, “I’m very grateful to everyone who has taken the time to support me along the path to my appointment”.
  2. I was able to apply via the ‘5 years equivalent experience’ qualification which I think is an excellent way of increasing diversity among the judiciary,” he told Legal Cheek,

“The fact I am mixed race, with no family connections to the law is again evidence of the way in which the judiciary is changing,” he added. Williams becomes the latest in a string of fresh-faced judicial appointments. In 2020, Legal Cheek reported that Baker McKenzie senior associate Jason Raeburn had become a judge at the age of 32,
View complete answer

Who is the most junior judge?

India’s youngest judge who never used Facebook or social media Meet Mayank Pratap Singh, the youngest judge of India who has created history by cracking the Rajasthan Judiciary Services Examination at the age of 21. Neither did he ever go for any coaching nor has ever used Facebook or WhatsApp! How Many Years Is Law School To Be A Judge Mayank Pratap Singh gives the credit for his success to his self study.(HT) “I have been studying for 6-8 hours regularly however, at times, I have also extended my studies for over 12 hours too,” Mayank said. Mayank topped the Rajasthan Judiciary Services Examination after completing his five-year law college studies.

  • I took this test after completing my final year of law studies and cracked it as a topper,”he says with jubilation.
  • I expected that I shall clear the exam but I had never hoped to top it.” However, the young judge was happy that the government reduced the minimum age criteria to take the test to 21 which earlier was 23.

“The moment I got the notification of reduction in age, I applied for this exam.” He gives the credit for his success to his self study. “I devoted my personal time and space to my studies which helped me crack the exam and I became a topper. College studies helped me a lot.” “I never ever had a Facebook account in my life.

In fact, I had deactivated all other social media accounts during my exam time. I used internet only to get legal updates, for getting track of some interesting or important judgement of Supreme Court or High Court.” “Many of my friends did make a mockery of me for being absent from social media and not using WhatsApp and Facebook.

However, with time, they got used to it,” he said. Mayank says that he was quite focussed on his goal and hence maintained a distance from social gatherings. “I attended only those gatherings which were important for me.” Answering a query on why he choose judiciary, he said, “I have seen people trusting the judiciary.

Mayank’s father had been a principal in Rajkumar Singh Government School and his mother too is teacher in a government school.His father says that he has been working hard since childhood and has always been a topper in school. SHARE THIS ARTICLE ON

: India’s youngest judge who never used Facebook or social media
View complete answer

How old do you have to be to be a judge UK?

Skills and qualifications – You’ll need:

a minimum of five or seven years’ post-qualification experience, depending on which role you apply for to be a citizen of the United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland or a Commonwealth country to be below the age of 70, which is the statutory retirement age for all judges

The JAC will also look for evidence of:

intellectual ability the ability to be fair and even-handed an air of authority good communication skills

You do not need to:

have advocacy experience be authorised to exercise higher rights of audience be a litigation specialist be working – many solicitors taking a career break may be eligible be in private practice – though some restrictions apply to the types of cases government and Crown Prosecution Service lawyers sitting in a fee-paid capacity can hear

Find out more on the JAC website about the skills and qualifications you’ll need, The Association of Women Solicitors (Aws) London runs an annual course for solicitors wanting to return to practice after a career break, or who have recently gone back to work. It includes information about judicial appointments. For more details, contact the AWS London,
View complete answer

What is the youngest judge UK?

Exclusive: Carlton Williams called to the bar just three months ago Carlton Williams A civil servant at the Home Office has become what is believed to be the country’s youngest judge. Carlton Williams, who only turned 29 in December, was recently appointed as a judge in the First Tier Tribunal in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber.

  1. He will preside over appeals against Home Office decisions relating to permission to stay in the UK, deportation from the UK, and entry clearance to the UK.
  2. Williams will leave his current position as a senior presenting officer, a civil service role where he represents the government in immigration appeals.

After leaving school at 16, Williams completed an LLB part-time through the Open University, graduating in 2021. This was followed by a master’s degree at The University of Law which he completed last year. He was only called to the bar in November 2022.

  • Williams describes the appointment as overwhelming, saying, “I’m very grateful to everyone who has taken the time to support me along the path to my appointment”.
  • I was able to apply via the ‘5 years equivalent experience’ qualification which I think is an excellent way of increasing diversity among the judiciary,” he told Legal Cheek,

“The fact I am mixed race, with no family connections to the law is again evidence of the way in which the judiciary is changing,” he added. Williams becomes the latest in a string of fresh-faced judicial appointments. In 2020, Legal Cheek reported that Baker McKenzie senior associate Jason Raeburn had become a judge at the age of 32,
View complete answer

How old is the youngest female judge?

Briony Clarke first joined the bench at 31 ? How Many Years Is Law School To Be A Judge The UK’s youngest ever female judge has bagged herself a promotion, Briony Clarke entered the history books when in 2017, she was sworn in as a deputy district judge on the London and South East circuit at the youthful age (by judicial standards) of just 31. How Many Years Is Law School To Be A Judge Briony Clarke Following her initial appointment to the bench, Legal Cheek was quick to draw readers’ attention to her remarkable legal career. At just 15 Clarke joined Essex outfit Taylor Haldane Barlex LLP (THB) and went on to juggle work and studies, completing her law degree and Legal Practice Course (LPC) at Anglia Ruskin University.

  • She qualified in 2009, became an accredited solicitor in 2010, an associate at THB in 2013, and a partner just one year later.
  • There have been a number of fresh-faced judicial appointments in recent years.
  • Criminal barrister Richard Archer was appointed a recorder at the sprightly age of 32, while Anna Midgley took up her spot on the bench at 33.

Elsewhere, lawyers Ita Farrelly and Adem Muzaffer secured judicial roles aged 32 and 34 respectively. For all the latest commercial awareness info, and advance notification of Legal Cheek’s careers events: Sign up to the Legal Cheek Hub
View complete answer

Who was the youngest justice ever appointed?

Younger Supreme Court appointees stay on the bench longer, but there are plenty of exceptions U.S. Supreme Court justices have lifetime tenure, so nominees to the court tend to draw attention for their age. The two most recent nominees are no exception.

At 49, Neil Gorsuch, President Donald Trump’s choice, would be a relatively young new member of the court. Merrick Garland, who was 63 when Barack Obama nominated him last March, would have been among the oldest. (Gorsuch’s nomination is pending; Garland’s expired.) That raises the question: Do justices who are younger when they join the court actually end up serving longer than older appointees? Not surprisingly, the answer is yes, though there are plenty of exceptions.

Overall, the age at which a new justice takes the oath of office is correlated with the eventual length of his or her tenure on the court, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of biographical data for all 104 former Supreme Court justices. (Our analysis excludes the eight current members since their tenure is ongoing.) Justices who were younger than 45 when they took the oath of office served an average of 21.6 years on the court; those who were ages 45 to 49 served an average of 19.4 years; and those 50 to 54 served an average of 18.6 years.

Justices ages 55 to 59 served an average of 14.6 years, and those 60 or older served an average of 11.7 years. (For two justices whose exact birth date was unavailable, we used Jan.1 of their birth year.) The youngest new Supreme Court justice ever was Joseph Story, who joined the court in 1812 at age 32.

The oldest was Horace Lurton, who became a justice in 1910 at 65. Most new justices were in their 50s when sworn in (58 of 104 when excluding those currently serving). By contrast, only four justices were younger than 40 when they joined the court. The Constitution a minimum or maximum age for serving on the court.

  1. When considering all former justices, newly installed members were an average of 53 years old when they were sworn in, served for an average of 16.9 years and ended their tenure at an average age of 69.
  2. If you factor in the eight current members of the court, these figures barely change.
  3. Gorsuch, who was nominated by Trump on Jan.31 to replace the late Antonin Scalia, would be slightly younger than the average new justice if he is confirmed by the Senate and takes the oath of office before the end of court’s current term this summer.

(He turns 50 at the end of August.) But he would still be older upon joining the court than one current member of the court was: Clarence Thomas was 43 when he became an associate justice in 1991. Two other current members of the court, Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Elena Kagan, were 50 when they were sworn in.

While younger justices have tended to serve longer on average, there are plenty of examples of older appointees staying on the court for a period that exceeds the historical average. For instance, current Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was 60 when she joined the court in 1993 and has served 23.5 years.

Harry Blackmun was 61 when he joined in 1970; he eventually served 24.2 years. And Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who was also 61 when he took the oath in 1902, ended up serving 29.1 years, leaving the bench when he was 90. There are also quite a few examples of justices who served for relatively short periods despite being comparatively young when they took the oath.

Alfred Moore, who took his oath in 1800 at the age of 44, served just 3.8 years. James Iredell, who was 38 when he joined the court in 1790, served 9.4 years. And John Jay, who was 43 when he became the nation’s first chief justice in 1789, served 5.7 years before leaving the post to serve as governor of New York.

Among more recent justices, Arthur Joseph Goldberg, who was 54 when he joined the court after being nominated by John F. Kennedy, stepped down less than three years later to become the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. (Goldberg moved to the UN at the request of Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon Johnson, but later said he,) Goldberg’s replacement on the court, Abe Fortas, was 55 when he joined the court but served only 3.6 years – well below average for justices in their 50s.
View complete answer

Who was the youngest chief judge?

Justice Hidayatullah – Hidayatullah National Law University Justice Md. Hidayatullah was born on 17th December 1905 at Betul in the erstwhile Central Provinces and Berar. He was educated at the Government High School, Raipur and Morris College, Nagpur.

  1. He went to England for further studies at the Trinity College, Cambridge and obtained B.A. and M.A.
  2. Degrees from there.
  3. He was called to the Bar from Lincoln’s Inn in 1930 when he was just 25 years old.
  4. On his return to India, he was enrolled as Advocate of the High Court of Central Provinces and Berar at Nagpur on 19th July 1930.

On 2nd August 1943, he became the Advocate General of Central Provinces and Berar and continued to hold the said post till he was appointed as Additional Judge of that High Court on 24th June 1946. He was appointed as Permanent Judge of the said High Court on 13th September 1946.

On 3rd December 1954, he was appointed as the Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court. On 1st December 1958, he was elevated to the Supreme Court and became the Chief Justice of India on 25th February 1968. He retired from that high office on 17th December 1970. In his time, he was the youngest Advocate General, the youngest Chief Justice of a High Court and the youngest Judge of the Supreme Court of India.

Justice Hidayatullah was sworn in as the Acting President of India on 20th July 1969 and served in that capacity till late V.V. Giri was sworn in as the duly elected President of the Republic. After his retirement as the Chief Justice of India, he was unanimously elected as the Vice President of India as a result of a consensus amongst different political parties and occupied that high office with distinction from 1979 to 1984.
View complete answer